



Popular Resistance School

Course 1: How Social Transformation Occurs


May 1, 2018

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Power Elite Model



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
Contrasting Models of Power: Powerholders vs People Power

People Power Model

- The powerholders' power is dependent on the cooperation, acquiescence, or support of the mass public, which is withdrawn when beliefs and values are violated, particularly by trusted leaders.
- Target is the grassroots.
- Alert, educate and mobilize the public.
- Tools include traditional and non-traditional methods.

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People Power Model



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What the Power Holders do

The task of the power holders is to maintain the status quo.

- Bureaucratic management
- Crisis management

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Bureaucratic Management

Prevent the issue from becoming public.

- Control the media.
- Deny it exists.
- Create societal myths.
- Create threats.

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Crisis Management

Minimize the issue, distract or appear to take action.

- Justification myths
- Create or reawaken demons
- Create trigger events
- Ignore, discredit, disable or repress the opposition
- Appear to be resolving the issue
- Make minor reforms
- Coopt the opposition

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Official versus Operative Policies

Official policies are the fictitious policies told to the public. They are described in terms of values and principles.

Operative policies are the actual policies that are kept hidden from the public because they violate the values and principles.

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What Social Movements do

The task of the social movement is to show it upholds the values and the power holders violate them.

Movements need to be grounded in the strongly felt and widely held human and cultural values, symbols, sensibilities, and traditions of the general population.

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What Social Movements do

- Keep the issue in the spotlight
- Counter the myths
- Eliminate the threats
- Organize and mobilize people
- Refuse to compromise too soon
- Support grassroots action
- Avoid focus on electoral, partisan politics
- Reject co-option

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Relevant sections from Bill Moyer's "Movement Action Plan"

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements are collective actions in which the populace is alerted, educated, and mobilized, over years and decades, to challenge the powerholders and the whole society to redress social problems or grievances and restore critical social values. By involving the populace directly in the political process, social movements also foster the concept of government of, by, and for the people. The power of movements is directly proportional to the forcefulness with which the grassroots exert their discontent and demand change. The central issue of social movements, therefore, is the struggle between the movement and the powerholders to win the hearts (sympathies), minds (public opinion), and active support of the great majority of the populace, which ultimately holds the power to either preserve the status quo or create change.

There needs to be a revival of democracy through "people power". The increasingly centralized power of the state and other social institutions, combined with the new use of the mass media to carry out the political process, has all but eliminated effective citizen participation in the decision-making process. Centralized powerholders now make decisions in the interests of a small minority, while simultaneously undermining the common good and aggravating critical social problems.

But people are powerful. Power ultimately resides with the populace. History is full of examples of an inspired citizenry involved in social movements that achieve social and political changes—even topple tyrannical governments. Powerholders know this. They know that their power depends on the support or acquiescence of the mass population.

Nonviolent social movements are a powerful means for preserving democracy and making societies address critical social problems. They enable citizens to challenge the prevailing centers of power and become active in society's decision-making process, especially at times when the normal channels for their political participation are ineffective. Social movements mobilize citizens and public opinion to challenge powerholders and the whole society to adhere to universal values and sensibilities and redress social problems. At their best, they create an empowered citizenry, shifting the locus of social and political power from central elites and institutions to new grassroots networks and groups.

TWO VIEWS OF POWER

Many activists simultaneously hold two contrasting models of power—power elite and people power. Each of these views, however, leads to opposite movement strategies and target constituencies.

The Power Elite Model holds that society is organized in the form of a hierarchical pyramid, with powerful elites at the top and the relatively powerless mass populace at the bottom. The elites, through their dominant control of the state, institutions, laws, myths, traditions, and social norms, serve the interests of the elites, often to the disadvantage of the whole society. Power flows from the top to bottom.

Since people are powerless, social change can be achieved only by appealing to the elites at the top to change their policies through normal channels and institutions, such as the electoral process, lobbying Congress, and use of the courts. The target constituency is the powerholders, and the method is persuasion, either convincing existing powerholders to change their view or to elect new powerholders. The chief opposition organizations are professional opposition organizations (POOs), which have national offices and staff in Washington, D.C., with regional offices around the country.

The People Power Model holds that power ultimately resides in the mass populace. Even in societies with strong power elites, such as the United States or Marcos-led Philippines, the powerholders' power is dependent on the cooperation, acquiescence, or support of the mass public. This model is represented by an inverse triangle, with the people at the top and the power elite

at the bottom.

People power is the model used by social movements. The movement's strategy is not only to use normal channels in an effort to persuade powerholders such as President Reagan to change their minds, but also to alert, educate, and mobilize a discontented, impassioned, and determined grassroots population using nonviolent means beyond the normal parliamentary methods institutions.

THE MOVEMENT'S SOURCE OF POWER

The source of power of social movements lies in two human qualities:

- A strong sense of right and wrong. People have deeply felt beliefs and values, and they react with extreme passion and determination when they realize that these values are violated.
- We understand the world and reality, in large part, through symbolism.

Social movements derive their power from an upset, impassioned, and motivated populace set into motion. This happens when people recognize that their strongly felt beliefs, values, and interests are unjustly violated, and the population is provided with hope that change can happen and a means for them to act. People are specially aroused to action when trusted public leaders, such as the President or Congresspeople, violate the public's trust to carry out their duties of office in an honest and lawful manner.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS VS. POWERHOLDERS

The process of achieving social change through social movements is the struggle between the movement and powerholders of the hearts, minds, and support (or acquiescence) of the general public. The powerholders advocate policies that are to the advantage of society's elites, but often to the disadvantage of the majority population and in violation of its strongly held values. Before movements begin, however, the populace is usually unaware of the problem and the violation of their values, but they would be very upset and easily spurred to action if they knew.

THE POWERHOLDER STRATEGY

The powerholders maintain their power and the status quo by hiding the moral violations of social conditions and by their policies through the following strategies:

- The first line of defense is through a strategy of "bureaucratic management" to prevent the issue from becoming a public issue. This is achieved by (1) "internalized obedience," keeping the problem out of the public's view of the world and thereby out of people's consciousness; (2) keeping issues out of the public spotlight and off the society's agenda; and (3) keeping the issue off of society's political agenda of hotly contested issues.
- Some of the means used by the powerholders to achieve this strategy are the following: (1) maintain hegemony of information available to the public through the media; (2) deny that the problem exists (e.g., "no arms have been sent to Iran"); (3) create "societal myths" which define the problem for the public exactly the opposite of reality, such as calling the contras "freedom fighters" or saying that the Marcos Duvallier governments were part of the "free world"; and (4) create the threat of demons, such as Communism and terrorism, to install fear in the general population so that they will unquestioningly support whatever policies the powerholders take.
- After a policy becomes a public issue, the powerholders are forced to switch to a "crisis management" strategy by doing the following: (1) vindicate unjust policies through "justification myths", which explain that their policies are needed to overcome a bigger evil (e.g., "we need to support President Marcos, a minor dictator, to prevent the worse evil of the Communist takeover in the Philippines"); (2) re-emphasize old demons or create new ones; (3) create trigger events to justify a new policy and to get public consent, such as when the American Government got the support of the American people for escalating the Vietnam War by proclaiming that American ships were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin; (4) overcome public opposition by first ignoring then discrediting, destabilizing, and if necessary, repressing the movement; (5) appearing to be involved in a resolution process through promises, new rhetoric, appointing studies and commissions, and negotiations, as in the Geneva nuclear arms reduction meetings; (6) make minor changes through reforms, compromises, and cooptation of opponents; and (7) coopt the opposition.
- The chief means by which the powerholders maintain unjust policies and keep them hidden from the public is by having a two-track system of "official" vs. "operative" doctrines and policies. (These are Noam Chomsky's terms.) Official policies are fictitious policies which are given to the general public. They are explained in high-sounding moral terms, such as

democracy and freedom. Operative policies, on the other hand, are the government's actual policies, which are kept hidden from the public because they violate widely held values and therefore would upset most citizens.

THE MOVEMENT'S STRATEGY

The movement's aim is to educate and win over an increasingly larger majority of the public, and to mobilize the majority public into an effective force that brings about social change. To achieve this, movements need to be grounded in the strongly felt and widely held human and cultural values, symbols, sensibilities, and traditions of the general population, such as freedom, democracy, justice, and human rights (but not those cultural values with which we disagree, such as the Monroe Doctrine's proclamation that the U.S. has the right to dominate Latin America). Only by showing the Public that the movement upholds these values, and that the powerholders violate them, can the population be won over and stirred to the level of passion required for them to act. In contrast, movement activities and attitudes that violate the society's values and sensibilities, including acts of violence and rebellious machismo posturing, have the opposite effect; they turn both the public and many other activists against the movement.

The movement's strategy, mirroring that of the powerholders, needs to accomplish the following:

- Publicly show that the social conditions and powerholder policies violate values, traditions, and self-interests of the general public. This includes publicly revealing the difference between official and operative policies and doctrines.
- Keep the issue and moral violations in the public spotlight and on society's agenda of hotly contested issues.
- Keep the issue and powerholders' policies on society's political agenda, such as having aid to the contras voted on in Congress rather than carried out secretly by the CIA.
- Counter the powerholders' social myths, justifications, and denials that the problem exists.
- Counter the powerholders' demonology. For example, the thousands of American "citizen diplomats" who visit Russia counter the Reagan

demonology that the Soviets are monsters and an "evil empire" by revealing that the Russians are people like us.

- Involve increasingly larger portions of the public in programs that challenge the powerholders' policies and promote alternative visions and programs.
- Don't compromise too much too soon.
- After a large majority of public opinion is won, have an "endgame" strategy that mobilizes the populace and institutions to create change, despite the determined opposition of the central powerholders.
- Finally the movement's organizations and leadership, especially at the national and regional levels, should serve, nurture, and empower the grassroots activists and promote participatory democracy within the movement.

Suggested reading:

[Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups and Average Citizens](#)

by Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, 2014.

[Senators of Both Parties respond to the Preferences of the Wealthy, and ignore those of the Poorest](#), by Thomas J. Hayes, 2013.

[Why Competition in the Politics Industry is failing America](#) by Katherine M. Gehl and Michael E. Porter, 2017.

[How did Corporate Power get a Stranglehold?](#) (The Powell Memo), 2011.

[Lifting the Veil of Mirage Democracy in the United States](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2013.

[Fighting for a Legitimate Democracy by and for the People](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2014.

2. How to build popular power

We cover some of the new data on successful social movements, characteristics of successful social movements, how to build a movement, when to negotiate and the effectiveness of violence versus nonviolence.

Slides:

Goals of lecture

After this lecture, you will be able to:

- Describe the characteristics of successful social movements
- Understand Grand Strategy and the Pillars of Power
- Outline the mechanisms of change
- Discuss violence vs nonviolence



Research on Social Movements

Contentious politics approach

- Political environment
- Organization and resources of resistance movement

Power depends on the consent of the civilian population, which can be withdrawn and transferred at any time

Source: Why Civil Resistance Works, Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, Columbia.



Requirements of Power

- Authority
- Human Resources
- Skills and Knowledge
- Intangible Factors
- Material Resources
- Sanctions

Source: On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, Robert Helvey, 2004, The Albert Einstein Institution.



Characteristics of successful social movements

- Mass movement
- Diverse
- National consensus
- 3.5% population mobilized
- Resilience



Participation is a Key Factor

- Physical barriers
- Informational barriers
- Moral barriers
- Commitment barriers
- Diversity

Impact of violence versus nonviolence on the above.

Source: Why Civil Resistance Works, Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, Columbia.



Diversity and Solidarity

Divide and conquer strategy:

- Blame games.
- Greater status, resources or policies that help some people.
- Threats of the above being taken away.



Grand Strategy

Evaluate the effectiveness of our strategy and tactics


Impact on the movement:

1. Expand alliances
2. Increase internal cohesion
3. Deepen our resolve

Impact on power holders:

1. Shrink our adversaries' alliances
2. Decrease their internal cohesion
3. Weaken their resolve

Pillars of Power



Weakening Pillars of Power

Pull, don't push, people from the pillars to the movement.

Create win-win situations – dilemmas that provoke power holders to act contrary to widely-held values or beliefs.

Present a vision of a better society for all.

Reassure people from the pillars that they have a place in the better society.

National Consensus

Stages of building national consensus:

1. There is a problem.
2. The current system won't fix the problem.
3. Support for a new system to solve the problem

Mobilization

The magic number is 3.5%.

No government, whether dictator or democracy, has been able to withstand an active mobilization of 3.5% of the population.

Some have fallen with less.

Resilience

Respond to your opponent

Flexibility

Tactical innovation

Avoid movement fatigue

Concentration and Dispersion

Celebrate victories

Negotiating Demands

Some things are negotiable and others are not.

Results of negotiations are based on the power dynamic.

Powerholders may enter negotiations at a time when the opponents are weak and don't have power to enforce agreements or as a way to salvage some power. These are to be avoided.

Mechanisms of Change

Accommodation – demands are not threatening to power holders, may be willing to compromise to end the campaign.

Nonviolent coercion – the pillars of support for the power holders have eroded and they can no longer operate as they did. Although they remain in power, demands are met because they have no choice.

Disintegration – the pillars of support for the power holders have become unoperable and the power holders lose their ability to maintain control.

Violence and Nonviolence

Definitions of nonviolence vary.

What is perceived as violence depends on the power dynamic.

Fundamental issue is the impact of the action – does it grow or shrink the movement?



Violence versus Nonviolence

Nonviolent struggle is a much more complex and varied means of struggle than is violence. The struggle is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons applied by the population and the institutions of the society.

All governments can rule only as long as they receive replenishment of the needed sources of their power. Political defiance, unlike violence, is uniquely suited to severing those sources of power.

– Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy



David and Goliath

When underdogs acknowledge their weakness and chose an unconventional strategy, their winning percentage goes from 28.5 to 63.6. When underdogs choose not to play by Goliath's rules, they win.

Since nonviolent struggle and violence operate in fundamentally different ways, even limited resistance violence during a political defiance campaign will be counterproductive, for it will shift the struggle to one in which the power holders have an overwhelming advantage.

If violence is to occur, separate it from the political defiance movement in space, time, population and issue.



Relevant section from Robert Helvey's "On Strategic Nonviolent Struggle"

Power is held by "pillars of support" -- organizations inside and out of government that allow it to continue day-to-day operations. When those pillars are weakened sufficiently the structure collapses like a building when its support structure gives way or is weakened.

Pillars of support include:

- Police the omnipresent face of government that protects and serves the power structure, they serve the system and many will change sides when the system fails,
- Military trump card of status quo, do not live in local area and have less contact with people, they need to be convinced they will have a role after the revolt,
- Civil servants government cannot operate without them),
- Media can be controlled by review board, self-censorship and serve as a mouthpiece for government,
- Business community provide essential services for the people, in US provide money for campaigns. Goal is profit and they must see a role for themselves in the future.

- Youth Those in power do not want youth to become active as they are the normal vanguard for change. Youth need to see they will gain in the new world created by the revolt and see the limits of the current reality. Intellectual clarity of right vs. wrong is a key motivator.
- Workers are being weakened by destruction of unions, globalization and stagnant wages. Key workers for movements are those involved in transit of people and goods.
- Religious organizations Can bring a moral or ethical perspective to the movement (or government). They are well connected with funding sources and people. Involving them in the movement can bring other key pillars of power.
- Non-governmental organizations NGOs can provide services, e.g. in a crisis or storm provide care and necessities.
- Others include professional organizations, political parties, foreign sources of support (business, government etc.), small groups in communities from walking/running clubs to knitting circles, to community organizations and garden clubs, book clubs and sports clubs. Movements need to develop national consensus and active participation requiring penetrating throughout society.

Developing strategies that pull members of the pillars of power to the opposition should be planned early in a campaign. Movements do not want a 'fight to the finish' mentality to develop where pillars think they must fight to keep their power. Strategies should be designed with the goal of pulling people from the pillars into the movement.

Relevant sections from Gene Sharp's "From Dictatorship to Democracy":

NOTE: In this discussion, dictators are the corporate duopoly and democrats are the people working for a democratic society.

Merits and limitations of negotiations

Negotiations are a very useful tool in resolving certain types of issues in conflicts and should not be neglected or rejected when they are appropriate.

In some situations where no fundamental issues are at stake, and therefore a compromise is acceptable, negotiations can be an important means to settle a

conflict. A labor strike for higher wages is a good example of the appropriate role of negotiations in a conflict: a negotiated settlement may provide an increase somewhere between the sums originally proposed by each of the contending sides. Labor conflicts with legal trade unions are, however, quite different than the conflicts in which the continued existence of a cruel dictatorship or the establishment of political freedom are at stake.

When the issues at stake are fundamental, affecting religious principles, issues of human freedom, or the whole future development of the society, negotiations do not provide a way of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. On some basic issues there should be no compromise. Only a shift in power relations in favor of the democrats can adequately safeguard the basic issues at stake. Such a shift will occur through struggle, not negotiations. This is not to say that negotiations ought never to be used. The point here is that negotiations are not a realistic way to remove a strong dictatorship in the absence of a powerful democratic opposition.

Negotiations, of course, may not be an option at all. Firmly entrenched dictators who feel secure in their position may refuse to negotiate with their democratic opponents. Or, when negotiations have been initiated, the democratic negotiators may disappear and never be heard from again.

Negotiated surrender?

Individuals and groups who oppose dictatorship and favor negotiations will often have good motives. Especially when a military struggle has continued for years against a brutal dictatorship without final victory, it is understandable that all the people of whatever political persuasion would want peace. Negotiations are especially likely to become an issue among democrats where the dictators have clear military superiority and the destruction and casualties among one's own people are no longer bearable. There will then be a strong temptation to explore any other route that might salvage some of the democrats' objectives while bringing an end to the cycle of violence and counter-violence.

The offer by a dictatorship of "peace" through negotiations with the democratic opposition is, of course, rather disingenuous. The violence could be ended immediately by the dictators themselves, if only they would stop waging war on their own people. They could at their own initiative without any bargaining restore respect for human dignity and rights, free political prisoners, end torture,

halt military operations, withdraw from the government, and apologize to the people.

When the dictatorship is strong but an irritating resistance exists, the dictators may wish to negotiate the opposition into surrender under the guise of making “peace.” The call to negotiate can sound appealing, but grave dangers can be lurking within the negotiating room.

On the other hand, when the opposition is exceptionally strong and the dictatorship is genuinely threatened, the dictators may seek negotiations in order to salvage as much of their control or wealth as possible. In neither case should the democrats help the dictators achieve their goals.

Democrats should be wary of the traps that may be deliberately built into a negotiation process by the dictators. The call for negotiations when basic issues of political liberties are involved may be an effort by the dictators to induce the democrats to surrender peacefully while the violence of the dictatorship continues. In those types of conflicts the only proper role of negotiations may occur at the end of a decisive struggle in which the power of the dictators has been effectively destroyed and they seek personal safe passage to an international airport.

Power and justice in negotiations

If this judgment sounds too harsh a commentary on negotiations, perhaps some of the romanticism associated with them needs to be moderated. Clear thinking is required as to how negotiations operate.

“Negotiation” does not mean that the two sides sit down together on a basis of equality and talk through and resolve the differences that produced the conflict between them. Two facts must be remembered. First, in negotiations it is not the relative justice of the conflicting views and objectives that determines the content of a negotiated agreement. Second, the content of a negotiated agreement is largely determined by the power capacity of each side.

Several difficult questions must be considered. What can each side do at a later date to gain its objectives if the other side fails to come to an agreement at the negotiating table? What can each side do after an agreement is reached if the

other side breaks its word and uses its available forces to seize its objectives despite the agreement?

A settlement is not reached in negotiations through an assessment of the rights and wrongs of the issues at stake. While those may be much discussed, the real results in negotiations come from an assessment of the absolute and relative power situations of the contending groups. What can the democrats do to ensure that their minimum claims cannot be denied? What can the dictators do to stay in control and neutralize the democrats? In other words, if an agreement comes, it is more likely the result of each side estimating how the power capacities of the two sides compare, and then calculating how an open struggle might end.

Attention must also be given to what each side is willing to give up in order to reach agreement. In successful negotiations there is compromise, a splitting of differences. Each side gets part of what it wants and gives up part of its objectives.

In the case of extreme dictatorships what are the pro-democracy forces to give up to the dictators? What objectives of the dictators are the pro-democracy forces to accept? Are the democrats to give to the dictators (whether a political party or a military cabal) a constitutionally-established permanent role in the future government? Where is the democracy in that? Even assuming that all goes well in negotiations, it is necessary to ask: What kind of peace will be the result? Will life then be better or worse than it would be if the democrats began or continued to struggle?

“Agreeable” dictators

Dictators may have a variety of motives and objectives underlying their domination: power, position, wealth, reshaping the society, and the like. One should remember that none of these will be served if they abandon their control positions. In the event of negotiations dictators will try to preserve their goals.

Whatever promises offered by dictators in any negotiated settlement, no one should ever forget that the dictators may promise anything to secure submission from their democratic opponents, and then brazenly violate those same agreements.

If the democrats agree to halt resistance in order to gain a reprieve from repression, they may be very disappointed. A halt to resistance rarely brings reduced repression. Once the restraining force of internal and international opposition has been removed, dictators may even make their oppression and violence more brutal than before. The collapse of popular resistance often removes the countervailing force that has limited the control and brutality of the dictatorship. The tyrants can then move ahead against whomever they wish. "For the tyrant has the power to inflict only that which we lack the strength to resist," wrote Krishnalal Shridharani.

Resistance, not negotiations, is essential for change in conflicts where fundamental issues are at stake. In nearly all cases, resistance must continue to drive dictators out of power. Success is most often determined not by negotiating a settlement but through the wise use of the most appropriate and powerful means of resistance available. It is our contention, to be explored later in more detail, that political defiance, or nonviolent struggle, is the most powerful means available to those struggling for freedom.

Necessary sources of political power

The principle is simple. Dictators require the assistance of the people they rule, without which they cannot secure and maintain the sources of political power. These sources of political power include:

- Authority, the belief among the people that the regime is legitimate, and that they have a moral duty to obey it;
- Human resources, the number and importance of the persons and groups which are obeying, cooperating, or providing assistance to the rulers;
- Skills and knowledge, needed by the regime to perform specific actions and supplied by the cooperating persons and groups;
- Intangible factors, psychological and ideological factors that may induce people to obey and assist the rulers;
- Material resources, the degree to which the rulers control or have access to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, and means of communication and transportation; and

- Sanctions, punishments, threatened or applied, against the disobedient and noncooperative to ensure the submission and cooperation that are needed for the regime to exist and carry out its policies.

All of these sources, however, depend on acceptance of the regime, on the submission and obedience of the population, and on the cooperation of innumerable people and the many institutions of the society. These are not guaranteed.

Full cooperation, obedience, and support will increase the availability of the needed sources of power and, consequently, expand the power capacity of any government.

On the other hand, withdrawal of popular and institutional cooperation with aggressors and dictators diminishes, and may sever, the availability of the sources of power on which all rulers depend. Without availability of those sources, the rulers' power weakens and finally dissolves.

Naturally, dictators are sensitive to actions and ideas that threaten their capacity to do as they like. Dictators are therefore likely to threaten and punish those who disobey, strike, or fail to cooperate. However, that is not the end of the story. Repression, even brutalities, do not always produce a resumption of the necessary degree of submission and cooperation for the regime to function.

If, despite repression, the sources of power can be restricted or severed for enough time, the initial results may be uncertainty and confusion within the dictatorship. That is likely to be followed by a clear weakening of the power of the dictatorship. Over time, the withholding of the sources of power can produce the paralysis and impotence of the regime, and in severe cases, its disintegration. The dictators' power will die, slowly or rapidly, from political starvation.

The degree of liberty or tyranny in any government is, it follows, in large degree a reflection of the relative determination of the subjects to be free and their willingness and ability to resist efforts to enslave them.

Interview with Erica Chenoweth by Eric Stoner:

What are the key factors to success for nonviolent campaigns, and why you think those factors are so influential?

The key factor to success is the power that mass, broad-based participation provides for a movement. It turns out that, on average, nonviolent campaigns tend to attract far more participants than their violent counterparts. This allows nonviolent campaigns to create or exploit cracks within the regime's pillars of support (economic elites, business elites, security forces, state media and civilian bureaucrats). Such cracks are difficult to create without mass mobilization with unarmed civilians, who simultaneously demonstrate their commitment, their noncooperation with the existing order and their disinterest in physically harming those whom they oppose. In addition to imposing serious economic, political and social costs on those who resist the movement's demands, civil resistance is also a form of psychological warfare — and a rather effective one at that.

Are there any factors that you think activists often neglect that can damage or even doom their efforts?

Sometimes I think movements focus too much on doom and gloom — they spend too much time and energy reliving the injustices, the horrors, the pain they've endured. It gets heavy or serious. But doom and gloom doesn't energize an otherwise frightened or apathetic audience. There is clearly a time and place to revisit the core concerns of the movement and the population. But because success is so highly dependent on power in numbers, I think many movements would benefit from trying to keeping the mood light, fun and humorous. It might pay to celebrate impending victory, rather than encouraging solemn or angry venting sessions.

The second thing I often notice is the sense that the movement will eventually win because it's "right," "just" or something like that. Unless campaigns find ways to mobilize mass participation, disrupt the normal order of things and deprive opponents of their means of maintaining the status quo, even the most righteous causes fall flat. Then people tend to get really bitter. But nonviolent resistance is about imposing costs, not just about the moral high ground.

Third, I think movements can over-rely on particular methods — like protests, rallies or occupations — that can exhaust participants or alienate the general population without effectively disrupting the opponent. At times, repeated protests make activists even more vulnerable to repression. Or mass demonstrations may disrupt the daily life of ordinary people far more than the opponent, thereby irritating potential supporters rather than truly imposing costs on the opponent. Either way, few generals win wars by using the same tactic at the same time of day every day. Movements that win generally mix up their tactics in some sort of sequence meant to maximize participation and disruption while minimizing exposure to repression and the collateral damage to ordinary folks.

Next, at every talk I give, there are always the skeptics who say that their situations are so different that nonviolent struggle cannot work. (Their unspoken implication is always one of two things: they need to use armed struggle or some mix of nonviolent and violent methods, or, more rarely, that the international community must act on their behalf to crush the opponent.) Now, it's natural for people to look for differences. I have been skeptical about the power of civil resistance myself. But over the past few years, I have come to realize that most civilian-based struggles have far more in common than they differ. And I think that for movements, it's a much more productive exercise to look for those similarities rather than differences, especially when it comes to strategy.

There are a number of key factors that are highly associated with the success of nonviolent campaigns, and Maria and I lay them out in our book. Most of them have less to do with what the opponent does, the kind of opponent or the kind of struggle, and have far more to do with the strategic choices the campaign makes. Although obviously context matters, most successful movements figure out ways to navigate local conditions in ways that allow them to challenge entrenched power regardless of its form.

Your study compares the effectiveness of nonviolent versus violent struggles for certain objectives (anti-regime, anti-occupation and succession). One of my big concerns lately relates to economic justice. It seems that often nonviolent movements succeed at ushering in more democratic governments, but fail to alter the balance of economic power in their countries. I'm thinking about India, the Philippines, South Africa and even the U.S., where the wealth and income

gap between whites and blacks has barely budged since the civil rights movement. Do you have any idea from your data about how effective nonviolent methods are when the goal relates to economic justice, or why progress on this front has apparently been so difficult?

I haven't studied the effects of nonviolent action on economic issues, such as inequality or other indicators. Part of the issue is data availability. Believe it or not, most governments don't keep very rigorous and reliable data on economic inequality! I plan to study this more in the future. However, there are many examples of national and international struggles that have brought local, national or international attention to issues of economic injustice — and many of them have even made progress. One can think of labor struggles such as the California Farm Workers Union led by Cesar Chavez, wage and labor struggles in Europe and Latin America, anti-corruption initiatives in Kenya, anti-free trade actions in Seattle in 1999 (and at subsequent meetings of the WTO), and anti-corporate actions in West Papua and the Niger Delta. I think Occupy has succeeded in bringing issues of economic inequality in the U.S. to the forefront of mainstream American politics — that's quite a feat in itself. And although total victory has not yet materialized, many small victories have certainly advanced these causes. One should not expect complete and immediate displacement of these systems, but should instead recognize when people have made real progress in areas that seemed hopeless and in situations in which they felt powerless.

What does the fact that dictatorships or authoritarian regimes have in many cases been replaced by more democratic governments that still face serious problems with inequality and poverty say about nonviolent struggle? And what can activists engaged in these campaigns do to make sure that the change that is brought about isn't merely superficial, but meaningful and durable?

Don't expect too much too fast. The kinds of changes we're talking about here require really long-term commitment, perhaps over generations. My colleague Stephen Zunes often says that liberal democracy is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for addressing issues of inequality. I tend to agree with him. But even when an unarmed struggle is unable to achieve total victory, there are often major shifts that we shouldn't ignore, even though they fall short of some sort of utopian vision of the future.

Take Egypt as an example. There is a lot of bad news coming out of Egypt these days. What was at first a breathtaking victory quickly turned dire. But I remain hopeful for one major reason: Today, Egyptians speak freely about their views, their grievances and their remaining conflicts. They steadfastly continue to unearth abuses and demand just resolutions. In a place where only a decade ago, one could not speak openly against Mubarak's regime, even to friends, people have decided to not be afraid anymore. Whether or not they have the system of representation they want, or whether they have the just economy so many crave, Egyptians have broken the barrier of fear that kept them silent about their grievances for so many years. And that gives me hope.

It's sometimes argued that the only reason nonviolent campaigns are effective is because the opponent actually fears what would happen if the movement turned violent (or because of a violent fringe that makes the nonviolent movement look more moderate). How do you respond when you hear arguments like this?

Well, although it's an interesting theory, it has no systematic empirical support. Kurt Schock and I are doing a study that shows that so-called "radical flanks," when they are adopted or attach themselves to a nonviolent campaign, do not improve the campaigns' odds of success at all. In fact, such violent wings could hurt nonviolent campaigns because they tend to lower participation. Once participants see violent actions initiated by (or on behalf of) the movement, many of them stop participating.

Furthermore, as a general statement, I think that many states would prefer, strategically, to face armed movements rather than unarmed ones. Violent flanks allow the government to justify using repression — against unarmed protesters as well as armed ones. And in general, governments are going to win at that game, particularly if the repression drives even more participants away.

Suggested reading:

[From Dictatorship to Democracy](#) by Gene Sharp, The Albert Einstein Institution

[On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict](#), by Robert Helvey, The Albert Einstein Institution
– Read chapters 3 and 4.

[History Teaches That We have the Power to transform the Nation](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2013.

Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, 2012, Columbia University Press.


3. Stages of successful social movements

We discuss Bill Moyer's Movement Action Plan: The Eight Stages of Successful Social Movements, including the political environment of each stage and the tasks of the movement in each stage.

Slides:

<p>Goals of lecture</p> <p>After this lecture, you will be able to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Explain that social movements go through expected stages.• Describe the various stages.• Understand the tasks of each stage. <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>Why Stages Matter</p> <p>"Within two years after 'take-off', most activists inevitably perceive that their movement is failing, and their own efforts are futile. This leads to burnout, dropout, and the dissipation of movements. Astoundingly, this happens even when social movements are progressing reasonably well along the road normally taken by successful social movements in the past! Consequently, many activists keep repeating the cycle of 'take-off' to 'despair and burnout' with each succeeding new movement."</p> <p>- Bill Moyer, Movement Action Plan</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>
<p>Eight Stages of Successful Social Movements</p> <p>Stage 1: Normal time Stage 2: Prove the Failure of Institutions Stage 3: Ripening Conditions Stage 4: Social Movement Take-Off Stage 5: Landing, Identity Crisis of Powerlessness. Stage 6: Majority Public Support and Building National Consensus Stage 7: Success National Consensus Turns the Tide, Endgame Stage 8: Continuing the Struggle</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>National Consensus</p> <p>To achieve success the public must be convinced of three things:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• That there is a problem (Stage 4)• To oppose current conditions and policies (Stages 4, 6 and 7)• To want and not fear alternatives (Stage 7) <p>Source: https://www.wri-irg.org/sites/default/files/public_files/06%20The%20movement%20action%20plan.pdf</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>

Bill Moyer's Movement Action Plan (MAP)



<http://3dprintingindustry.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/movement-action-plan.jpg>

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage One: Normal Times

Environment:

Values are being violated, but it is accepted
The issue is not in the spotlight
Opposition is small and ridiculed

Tasks:

Document the problem
Maintain the opposition

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Two: Prove the Failure

Environment:

The problem and policies of the power holders continue.
Little dissent or attention
Feels like the problem will exist forever

Positive results are not expected
This is a difficult stage

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Two: Prove the Failure

Tasks:

Document the problem
Document the power holders' involvement in the problem
Document that normal channels of advocacy fail
Become experts by producing research
Build small opposition organizations

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Three: Ripening Conditions

Environment:

More people are aware of the problem
Public opinion for opposition increases to 30%
Population of discontented and allies grows
New waves of opposition, especially at local level
Issue is still not on society's agenda

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Three: Ripening Conditions

Tasks:

Recognize the historical forces at play
Create, inspire and prepare new wave groups, new networks and new leadership
New groups criticize professional groups that work with power holders
Activate pre-existing networks
Personalize the problem
Begin a new small prototype nonviolent action project

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Four: Take-Off

Environment:

A new social movement bursts on the scene and seems to take the public by surprise
Everyone seems to be talking about the problem
"Trigger event" occurs that reveal the problem
Action campaign follows – mass rallies, dramatic civil disobedience
Local action campaigns follow
People understand official versus operative policies
Opposition gains majority public support

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Four: Take-Off

Tasks:

Create a new grassroots-based social movement
Put the power holders' policies in the public spotlight
Have a public platform to educate population
Create public dissonance on the issue
Win public support
Become recognized as the opposition
*Not trying to get power holders to change policies yet

Popular
Resistance.org

Stage Five: Landing

Environment:

High hopes turn to despair because change did not happen
Movement is viewed as weak and the power holders as strong
Problems continue
Movement is reported to be dead
Beware: Activists may become more militant
In reality, success was putting issue on national agenda and creating a new movement



Stage Five: Landing

Tasks:

Show a long-term strategy
Create support groups to avoid despair
Adopt strategic nonviolence
Adopt empowerment models of organization and leadership
Move from protesters to social change agents
Expect and take actions to diminish infiltration



Stage Six: Building National Consensus

Long process of eroding the social, political, and economic supports that enable the powerholders to continue their policies. It is a slow process of social transformation that create a new social and political consensus, reversing those of normal times.

The movement's chief goal is to nurture, support, and empower grassroots activists and groups because the power of professional opposition organizations in Washington, DC are only as powerful as the power of their grassroots.



Stages Seven and Eight

In Stage Seven, "Success," the long process of building opposition reaches a new plateau in which the new social consensus turns the tide of power against the powerholders and begins an endgame process leading to the movement's success.

In Stage Eight, "Continuing the Struggle," the movement now needs to address some hard questions: What is success? What needs to be done next? The movement needs to recognize successes achieved, follow up on the demands won, raise larger issues, focus on other demands which are in various stages, and propose larger alternatives and a new paradigm.



Relevant sections from Bill Moyer's "Movement Action Plan":

STAGE ONE: NORMAL TIMES

In this first stage—normal times—there are many conditions that grossly violate widely held, cherished human values such as freedom, democracy, security, and justice, and the best interests of society as a whole. Moreover, these conditions are maintained by the policies of public and private powerholders, and a majority of public opinion. Yet, these violations of values, sensibilities, and self-interest of the general society are relatively unnoticed; they are neither in the public spotlight nor on society's agenda of hotly contested issues. Normal times are politically quiet times. Some past normal times were the violations of Blacks' civil rights before 1960; the Vietnam War before 1967; and U.S. intervention in Central America and support for Marcos, Duvalier, and apartheid before 1985.

Opposition

The opposition of these conditions and policies is small and receives more public ridicule than support. Consequently, its efforts are relatively ineffective. There are three major kinds of opposition: professional opposition organizations (POOs),

ideological or principled dissent groups, and grassroots groups that represent the victims.

The professional opposition organizations are centralized formal organizations, often with national offices in Washington, D.C., which try to win achievable reforms through mainstream political channels such as the electoral process, Congress, and the courts. They are hierarchical, with a board of directors, strong staff, and a mass membership that carries out nationally decided programs. These efforts have little success because they do not have sufficient public support to provide the political clout required to create change.

The principled dissent groups hold nonviolent demonstrations, rallies, pickets, and occasional civil disobedience actions. These groups are usually small, little noticed, and ineffective at achieving their demands. Through their symbolic actions, however, the principled dissent groups are a shining moral light in the darkness.

The grassroots groups are composed of local citizens who oppose present conditions and policies but do not yet have the support of the majority local population. They represent the victims' perspective, provide direct services to victims, and also carry out programs similar to those of the other opposition groups.

Powerholders

The powerholders often promote policies that support the interests of society's privileged and powerful, and which violate the interests and values of the society as a whole. The powerholders maintain these policies primarily by keeping them out of the public spotlight and off the society's agenda of contested issues. They have to keep these policies hidden from the general public because they know that the populace would be upset and demand changes if they knew the truth. The powerholders are able to maintain these policies and keep them hidden from the public by successfully carrying out their two-tact strategy of highly proclaiming their official doctrine and policies, stated in terms of the society's values and interests, while hiding from the public their actual or operative doctrines and policies.

Public

A political and social consensus supports the powerholders' official policies and status quo because the public does not know that the government is actually functioning according to the opposite operative doctrine policies. Consequently, the general populace is unaware that the social conditions and public policies violate their values and self interests; or, when they do know, they believe the justifications as to why they can't be changed or are needed to protect a higher cause or value. As a result, the public is not aware that there is a serious problem. Possibly only 10 to 15 percent of the population disagrees with the powerholders' policies.

Goals

The goals at this stage are:

- to document that a serious problem exists,
- to maintain an active opposition no matter how small, and
- to move to the next stages.

Pitfalls

The main danger is to be stuck in normal times indefinitely because of political naivete, not knowing the realities of political and social life, and feeling powerless to create change.

Conclusion

Normal times are politically quiet times because the powerholders successfully promote their official doctrine and policies while hiding their actual operative doctrine and policies, thereby keeping the violations of conditions and their policies out of the public consciousness and off society's agenda. The opposition feels hopeless because it seems that the situation will continue indefinitely, and they feel powerless to change it. Beneath the calm surface, however, the contradictions between society's values and the powerholders' actual, operative policies hold the seeds for popular discontent that can create dramatic changes.

STAGE TWO: PROVE THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONS

The intensity of public feeling, opinion, and upset required for social movements to occur can happen only when the public realizes that the governmental policies violate widely held beliefs and values. The public's upset becomes especially intensified when official authorities violate the public trust by using the power of office to deceive the public and govern unfairly and unlawfully. Hannah Arendt wrote that "people are more likely driven to action by the unveiling of hypocrisy than the prevailing conditions." This was clearly shown by the dramatic turnaround of the American public's opinion of President Reagan after Irangate exposed that instead of acting on his official policy of leading the world's defiant fight against terrorists, his operative policy was actually cooperating, supporting, and making deals with terrorists.

Opposition

The opposition must prove both that the problem exists and that the official powerholders and institutions perpetuate the problem. Therefore, the opposition must:

- Undertake research to prove that a problem exists which violates social values and sensibilities.
- Prove that the official doctrine and policies of governmental powerholders and institutions violate society's values and the public trust. This must be not only from researching the facts but also from actually trying every avenue for official citizen participation in the democratic process for deciding on social policies and programs, and proving that they do not work.
- Testify, undertake challenges, and file complaints in every branch of the bureaucratic machinery at the local, state, and federal level of both public and private bodies that are supposed to be open for citizen participation and redress.
- Prove that they are "kangaroo courts". Go to every decision-making body whether welcome or not.
- File suit in the courts.

- Take their concerns to city council, state assembly, and national Congress. These programs are usually primarily carried out through the auspices of professional opposition organizations.

Positive results are not expected now. The point is not to win the cases, but to prove that the powerholders are preventing the democratic system from working. Eventually, however, some of these cases might actually be won and have the powerful impact of creating a movement and social change. After twenty years in the courts, for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's case of *Brown vs. U.S.* was won in the Supreme Court in 1954. It established the principle that "separate but equal" was no longer the law of the land, which became a legal basis for the civil rights movement.

Powerholders

The powerholders fight the opposition through the normal channels, usually winning easily while continuing their operative policies and programs. The powerholders do not feel much threatened or concerned, and they handle the situation as a problem of bureaucratic management rather than a crisis of public confidence and power. Through the mass media, they easily promote their official policies while hiding their operative policies thus successfully keeping the whole potential problem out of peoples' consciousness and the public spotlight, and off of society's agenda.

Public

Public opinion and social consensus continues to support the government's official policies and status quo, as the consciousness of the general population remains unchanged. Yet, even the low level of evolving conditions and opposition causes public opinion against these policies to rise from about 10 to 20 percent. Except for the rare media coverage of opponents' activities, the problem is still neither in the public spotlight nor on society's agenda of contested issues.

Goals

- Document the problem, including the involvement of the powerholders.

- Document the citizens' attempt to use the normal channels of citizen participation and prove that they did not work.
- Become experts.
- Build small opposition organizations.

Pitfalls

- Holding the belief that social problems can be corrected by POOs using mainstream institutions and methods without building a new social consensus, mobilizing widespread grassroots opposition, and engaging in a long struggle, which uses extra-parliamentary nonviolent action that changes the present imbalance of power.
- Continuing to feel powerless and hopeless.

Conclusion

This stage can be particularly disheartening. The problem and the policies of powerholders continue unabated, there is little dissent or publicity, and the situation seems like it might continue indefinitely—as indeed it might. Yet the efforts of this stage can eventually be used to prove that the emperor has no clothes and is a prerequisite for any future social movement. Nevertheless, this stage is for the stout-hearted, determined, and persistent.

STAGE THREE: RIPENING CONDITIONS

The "take-off" of a new social movement requires preconditions that build up over many years. These conditions include broad historic developments, a growing discontented population of victims and allies, and a budding autonomous grassroots opposition, all of which encourage discontent with the present conditions, raise expectations that they can change, and provide the means to do it.

The historical forces are usually long-term, broad trends and events that worsen the problem, upset subpopulations, raise expectations, promote the means for new activism, and personify the problem. They are mostly outside the control of the opposition. For example, some of the historical forces that made the 1960s

ripe for the Black civil rights movement included the emergence of independent Black African countries, the large Northern migration of Blacks who maintained their ties to the segregated South, the rising black college student population, and the 1954 Supreme Court's Brown vs. U.S. decision that provided a legal basis for full civil rights.

Opposition

A tremendous unheralded ripening process happens within the opposition:

- There needs to be a growing consciousness and discontent among subpopulations of victims and their allies, providing them with a new level of understanding about the seriousness of the problem, the values violations, how they are affected, and the illicit involvement of the powerholders and their institutions. The discontent can be caused by (1) either perceived or real worsening conditions, which creates many new victims, such as in the 1970s when hundreds of new atomic plant sites upset millions of Americans who lived nearby; (2) rising expectations, as when the new wave of Black college students felt themselves to be full citizens but were refused the simple civil rights of service at local lunch counters; or (3) personalization of the problem, in which the problem is revealed through the experience of real victims, as when four church women were killed in El Salvador in 1980.
- The growing numbers of discontented local people across the country quietly start new autonomous local groups, which as a whole form a "new wave" of grassroots opposition, which is independent from the established POOs. These groups soon become frustrated with the official institutions, channels, and powerholders, which they realize are totally biased in support of the status quo; and they become increasingly upset with some of the established POOs, whom they see as working in a dead-end process with the powerholders.
- Small local prototype demonstrations and nonviolent action campaigns begin to dramatize the problem, put a dim public spotlight on it, and set a precedent for future actions.

- A few key facilitator-visionaries provide the new-wave local opposition with information, ideology, training, networking, hope, and a vision of a rising opposition.
- Pre-existing networks and groups, which can provide support, solidarity, and participants for a new movement, need to become available to be used in the new movement. The nonintervention movement, for example, had available for its take-off church networks, which had lots of experience in Central America, and activists who had been in the nuclear weapons and energy movements, both of which had just got out of their own take-off stages.

Powerholders

Though irritated, the powerholders remain relatively unconcerned, believing that they can continue to contain the opposition through management of mainstream social, political, and communications institutions. The official policies remain publicly believed and unchallenged, and the operative policies continue to be hidden from the general populace.

Public

A public consensus to support the powerholders' policies, and the problem remains off society's agenda. Yet, the growing public awareness of the problem, discontent, and new wave opposition, primarily at the local level, quietly raises the public opinion opposing current powerholder policies to 30 percent, even though the issue remains off society's agenda.

Goals

The purpose of this stage is to help create the conditions for the take-off of a social movement. The goals are:

- Recognize historical conditions that help make a new movement possible.
- Create, inspire, and prepare the new wave groups, including the formation of new networks, leadership, and expertise that will spearhead the new movement.

- Prepare pre-existing networks to be concerned about the issue and involved in the upcoming movement.
- Personalize the problem.
- Begin a small prototype nonviolent action project.

Pitfalls

Some of the key hazards of this stage include:

- Not recognizing the ripening conditions for a new social movements.
- Having the bureaucracy, legalism, and centralized power of the POOs squash the creativity, independence, nonviolent methods, and spontaneity of the new grassroots groups.

Conclusions

The stage is set for new social movement. There is a critical problem that appears to be worsening, proven violations by the powerholders, many victims, spreading discontent, historical conditions, available pre-existing networks, and an emerging new wave of grassroots opposition. Yet, no one—the public, powerholders, or even the new wave activists—is expecting the emergence of a new movement.

STAGE FOUR: SOCIAL MOVEMENT TAKE-OFF

New social movements surprise and shock everyone when they burst into the public spotlight on the evening TV news and in newspaper headlines. Overnight, a previously unrecognized social problem becomes a social issue that everyone is talking about. It starts with a highly publicized, shocking incident, a "trigger event", followed by a nonviolent action campaign that includes large rallies and dramatic civil disobedience. Soon these are repeated in local communities around the country.

The trigger event is a shocking incident that dramatically reveals a critical social problem to the general public in a new and vivid way, such as the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to move to the back of a Montgomery bus in 1955, NATO's 1979 announcement to deploy American Cruise and Pershing 2 nuclear weapons in Europe, or the Marcos government's shooting of Ninoy Aquino as he arrived at

the Manila airport in 1983. Trigger events can be deliberate acts by individuals, governments, or the opponents, or they can be accidents.

By starkly revealing to the public that a social condition and powerholder policies blatantly violate widely held cherished social values, citizen self-interest, and the public trust, the trigger event instills a profound sense of moral outrage in the general populace. Consequently, the general population responds with great passion, demanding an explanation from the powerholders and ready to hear more information from the opposition. The trigger event is also a trumpet's call to action for the new wave opposition groups around the country.

Opposition

A new social movement is created only when the opposition organizes a dramatic nonviolent action campaign immediately following the trigger event and when the nonviolent action campaign is repeated in local areas across the country. The nonviolent action campaign keeps the public spotlight on the problem and builds social tension over time. This "politics as theater" process becomes a social crisis, which turns the problem into a public issue. The shooting of Aquino, for example, was followed the next week by a million people in a Marcos-banned funeral march down the streets of Manila, and the NATO Cruise and Pershing 2 decision was followed by gigantic protest demonstrations in the capitols of Europe.

The success of nonviolent action campaigns is based on sociodrama demonstrations. Sociodrama demonstrations are simple demonstrations that:

- are dramatic and exciting;
- enable demonstrators to put themselves into the key points where the powerholders carry out their policies;
- clearly reveal the values violations by the powerholders;
- show the movement supporting and representing the values, symbols, myths, and traditions of the society; and
- are repeatable in local communities across the country.

These are dilemma demonstrations in which the powerholders lose regardless of their reaction. If they ignore the demonstrators, the policies are prevented from being carried out. If, on the other hand, the demonstrators are harassed or arrested, it puts public sympathy on the side of the demonstrators and against the powerholders. For example, during the sit-ins when Blacks sat at the lunch counters to eat, if angry white crowds attacked them or the police arrested them, the public got upset and sided with the demonstrators; if the police did nothing, the Blacks would either have to be served or, just by sitting there, prevent business as usual.

The new movement takes off as the nonviolent action campaigns are their sociodrama actions are repeated in local communities throughout the country. The demonstrations in Manila, for example, were followed by demonstration throughout the Philippines. The 1977 Seabrook reactor occupation created immediate spontaneous support demonstrations across the country, and, within months, hundreds of new grassroots antinuclear energy groups started up, who soon began occupying their own local nuclear power plants.

Scores of new independent local action groups spring into being, forming a new wave decentralized grassroots autonomous opposition that is based on non violent resistance. Movement take-off is the result of thousands of people across the country taking spontaneous actions and forming new protest groups (or revitalizing old ones). These new groups usually adopt loose organizational structures that are based on direct participatory democracy, little formal structure, and loosely defined membership. Together these groups form a new wave of movement because they are a new force and are not connected to either the established POOs or principled dissent organizations. Why do social movements take off? Some of the reasons why movements take off are:

- The right conditions were created by the earlier stages. The Movement Action Plan 19
- The public, altered by the mass media because of the trigger event and nonviolent action campaigns, is outraged by the contradiction between its values and the social conditions and powerholders' operative policies.

- The new movement groups join the powerholders as the keepers of society's values and symbols.
- The new climate of social crisis gives hope and inspires action by many citizens.
- The repeatability of the nonviolent action campaign in local areas provides grassroots activists with an effective means for involvement, which they believe can be effective.
- Participation in the new movement gives meaning to many peoples' lives because it gives them an opportunity to act out their beliefs, feelings, and spirituality.

Powerholders

The powerholders are shocked, upset, and angry. They realize that the genie is out of the bottle. They have lost on the first law of political control: keep issues out of people's consciousness and the public spotlight, and off society's agendas. They take a hard line in defending their policies and criticizing the new movement, calling it radical, irresponsible, and even communist-inspired. While some liberal politicians support the movement's position, mainstream Republicans and Democrats alike continue to support existing government policies.

Public

Within a year or two, public opinion opposing government operative policies rapidly grows from 30 percent to 50 percent, as for the first time the general populace sees the operative policies and hears views countering those of the powerholders. The public is upset and concerned by the stark contrast between what they see and hear in the news and what the government tells them. That is, they begin to see for the first time the difference between the official and operative policies revealed to them by the trigger event and the movement.

Goals

The overall goal of this stage is to get the whole society to begin seeing, thinking, and acting on the social problem. A movement take-off gets the whole society moving on the issue. The specific goals are:

- Create a new grassroots-based social movement.
- Put the powerholders' policies in the public consciousness and spotlight and on society's agenda of contentious public issues.
- Create a public platform for the movement to educate the populace.
- Create public dissonance on the issue. That is, force the general population to have to think about the issue by having two contradictory views of reality presented to them constantly.
- Win the sympathies and the opinions of the public.
- Become recognized as the legitimate opposition. Getting the powerholders to change their minds and policies is not a goal of this stage!

Pitfalls

The main pitfalls of this stage are:

- political naivete;
- burnout from overwork, not seeing progress as success, and unrealistic expectations of immediate victory; and
- arrogant self-righteousness and radicalism.

Conclusion

The take-off stage is an exciting time of trigger event, dramatic actions, passion, a new social movement, public spotlight, crisis, high hopes and output of energy. Both a previously unrecognized social problem and official policies become a public issue, and within two years a majority public opinion is won. But take-off is the shortest stage. After relatively rapidly achieving the goals of this stage, the movement progresses to Stage Six. However, many activists don't recognize this success. Instead, they believe that the movement has failed and their own efforts have been futile; consequently, they move to Stage Five.

STAGE FIVE: IDENTITY CRISIS OF POWERLESSNESS

After a year or two, the high hopes of movement take-off seems inevitably to turn into despair. Most activists lose their faith that success is just around the corner and come to believe that it is never going to happen. They perceive that the

powerholders are too strong, their movement has failed, and their own efforts have been futile. Most surprising is the fact that this identity crisis of powerlessness and failure happens when the movement is outrageously successful—when the movement has just achieved all of the goals of the take-off stage within two years. This stage of feelings of self-identity crisis and powerlessness occurs simultaneously with Stage Six because the movement as a whole has progressed to the majority stage.

Opposition

Belief that the movement is failing

Many activists conclude that their movement is failing because they believe that:

- The movement has not achieved its goals. After two years of hard effort, which included big demonstrations, dramatic civil disobedience, arrests, court scenes and even time in jail, media attention, and even winning a majority of public opinion against the powerholders' policies, the movement has not achieved any of its goals. The government is still waging the war in Vietnam, building five nuclear weapons a day, or sending aid to the contras. The problem, however, is not that the movement has failed to achieve its goals, but that expectations that its goal could possibly be achieved in such a short time were unrealistic. Achieving changes in public policies in the face of determined opposition of the powerholders takes time, often decades.
- Judging that the movement has failed because it has not achieved its goals after two years is analogous to parents criticizing their daughter for not graduating after completing two years in college with straight "A" grades. Parents don't do this because they know that achieving a B.S. degree is a four-year process. The movement, therefore should be judged not by whether it has won yet, but by how well it is progressing along the road of success.
- The movement has not had any "real" victories. This view is unable to accept the progress that the movement has made along the road of success, such as creating a massive grassroots-based social movement, putting the issue on society's agenda, or winning a majority of public

opinion. Ironically, involvement in the movement tends to reduce activists' ability to identify short-term successes. Through the movement, activists learn about the enormity of the problem, the agonizing suffering of the victims, and the complicity of powerholders. The intensity of this experience tends to increase despair and the unwillingness to accept any short-term success short of achieving ultimate goals. "What difference does it make that a majority of the American people and Congress oppose contra aid, when people are still being killed in Central America?" This is another version of judging the movement for not having achieved its ultimate goals rather than by whether it is making reasonable progress along the road.

- The power holders seem too powerful—they have not changed either their minds or their policies, but defiantly proclaim them louder than ever, totally ignoring the protests of the movement and the objections of half of the populace. The failure of the central powerholders to change either their minds or policies is a poor indicator of the movement's progress. The central powerholders will be the last segment of society to change their minds and policies. The longer that the public sees that the powerholders are violating social values and ignoring the democratic majority opinion, the higher the political costs to the powerholders for continuing those policies. Continued use of public exposure of the powerholders upholding these policies in the face of public opinion, therefore, can be an indicator that the powerholders' original goal of keeping the issue out of public consciousness and off the society's agenda is failing. For example, with increasing worldwide media coverage of President Botha's proclamations of apartheid and the effects of this policy, the world's resistance to apartheid increases.
- The movement is dead because it no longer looks like the take-off stage. The image that most people have of successful social movement is that of the take-off stage—giant demonstrations, civil disobedience, media hype, crisis, and constant political theater—but this is always short-lived. Movements that are successful in take-off soon progress to the much more powerful but more sedate-appearing majority stage, as described in the next section. Although movements in the majority stage appear to be smaller and less effective as they move from a national to local focus, and from mass actions to less visible grassroots organizing, they actually

undergo enormous growth in size and power. The power of the invisible grassroots provide the power of national social movements.

- The powerholders and mass media report that the movement is dead, irrelevant, or non-existent. The powerholders and mass media not only report that the movement is failing, but they also refuse to acknowledge that a massive popular movement exists. Large demonstrations and majority public opposition are dismissed as "vaguely reminiscent of the Sixties", rather than recognized as social movements at least as big and relevant as those 20 years ago. And when movements do succeed, they are not given credit. The demise of nuclear energy is said to be caused by cost overruns, high lending rates, lack of safety, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, rather than from the political and public opposition created by the people power.

Battle Fatigue

By the end of take-off, many activists suffer from "battle fatigue". After two years of virtual 'round-the-clock activity in a crisis atmosphere, at great personal sacrifice, many activists find themselves mentally and physically exhausted and don't see anything to show for it. Out of quilt or an extreme sense of urgency, many are unable to pace themselves with adequate rest, fun, leisure, and attendance to personal business. Eventually, large numbers of activists who were part of movement take-off lose hope and a sense of purpose; they become depressed, burn out, and drop out.

Stuck in Protest

Another reason why many activists become depressed at this time is that they are unable to switch from protesting against authority in a crisis atmosphere to waging long-term struggle to achieve positive changes. Many activists are unable to switch their view of the process of success from one of mass demonstrations to that of winning the majority of public through long-term grassroots organizing. Consequently, being active in Stage Six feels like they are abandoning the movement. In addition, many principled dissenters believe that the majority stage movement is not pure enough. The new movement organizations are seen as a

new oppressive authority. Many other activists originally joined the movement assuming it was a short-term time of crisis and are not prepared for long-term involvement. Finally, another reason why many activists are unable to switch to Stage Six is that they do not have the knowledge or skills required to understand or participate in the majority stage. For example, nonviolence trainers play a critical leadership and teaching role during the take-off stage, but virtually disappear in the majority stage because they lack the understanding and skills to train activists to participate in this stage.

Rebelliousness, machismo, and more "militant" action and violence are some of the negative effects of feelings of despair and powerlessness.

Some activists at this time adopt more militant, even violent, actions. They believe the nonviolent methods used to date have failed because they were too weak. New splinter groups are started to carry out the militant strategy, such as the Committee for Direct Action at Seabrook in 1979. These efforts are often reckless and defiant acts of despair, frustration and rage, which stem from the collapse of unrealistic expectations that the movement should have achieved its goals within the first two years. Because they turn off both other activists and the general public, militant actions invariably do more harm than good. These methods are also advocated by outside groups who want to use the movements to pursue their own ends, or by agent provocateurs.

The movement needs to make deliberate effort to undercut this problem. First, it needs to reduce the feelings of despair and disempowerment by providing activists with a long term strategic framework, such as MAP, which helps them realize that they are powerful and winning, not losing. Also, it is important that the movement adopt clear guidelines of total nonviolence, which are widely publicized and agreed to by all groups and activists which officially participate in the movement. The nonviolent policy must be enforced by having nonviolent guidelines and training for all demonstration participants, and by having adequate "peacekeeping" at all demonstrations.

Widespread Burnout

The feelings of failure and exhaustion, the organizational crisis, the calls for

militant actions, confusion, hopelessness, and powerlessness all contribute to widespread burnout among activists.

Organizational Crisis

The loose organizational model of the new wave local organizations begins to become a liability after six months. The loose structure promoted the flexibility, creativity, participatory democracy, independence, and solidarity needed for quick decisions and nonviolent actions during take-off. But after six months, the loose organizational structures tend to cause excessive inefficiency, participant burnout, and an informal hierarchy.

Toward Empowerment

Movement activists need to realize what the powerholders already know—that power ultimately lies with the people, not the powerholders. They need to recognize the power and success of social movements—including their own. Some ways in which activists can overcome their identity crisis of disempowerment are the following:

- Use an analytic framework of successful social movements, such as MAP, to evaluate their movement, identify successes, and set strategy and tactics.
- Form personal/political support groups that enable activists to participate in movements as holistic human beings, take care of their personal needs, reduce guilt, have fun, and provide support (and challenge) in doing political analysis and work.
- Adopt a strict policy of nonviolence.
- Adopt "empowerment" models of organization and leadership at both the national and local levels. The empowerment model is a third way that tries to maximize the positive and minimize the negatives of both the hierarchical and the loose models, trying to blend participatory democracy, efficiency, personal support, and effectiveness. This model of leadership more resembles the nurturing mother than the strong patriarchal father. While the national organization leadership need to coordinate and represent the whole movement, their primary goal should be to nurture

the empowerment of the grassroots and foster democracy and non-elitism within the whole movement.

- Help activists evolve from protestors to long-term social change agents. Provide social change agent training, which includes not only nonviolence but all the skills for understanding and organizing successful social change movements. Powerholders
- Continue a hardline strategy, including escalating their policies to prove that they are in charge and that both the movement and public have no effect.
- Infiltrate the movement to get intelligence and to confuse, disrupt, and discredit the new activism. Agent provocateurs promote wild schemes, violence, structurelessness, disorganization, rebelliousness, machismo, and schemes to dominate organizations.

Public

The general populace experiences dissonance, not knowing who or what to believe. While many agree with the movement's challenges, they also fear siding with dissidents and losing the security of the powerholders and status quo. The alternatives are unclear to them. The general citizenry is about evenly divided, 50 percent to 50 percent, between the powerholders and the movement. Movement violence, rebelliousness, and seeming anti-Americanism turn people off and tend to frighten them into supporting the powerholders' policies, police actions, and status quo.

Goals

The overall goal is to help activists become empowered and move on to Stage Six, to catch up with their movement. They need to learn what the long road of success looks like, and how far they have come along that road. Some specific goals are to help activists:

- become strategists by using a framework such as MAP,
- form political and personal support groups,
- adopt nonviolence,

- adopt empowerment models of organization and leadership, and
- move from protesters and long-life social change agents.

Pitfalls

The chief pitfalls of this stage that must be overcome are:

- Disempowerment—feeling the movement is losing when it is succeeding
- The "tyranny of structurelessness" and anti-leadership
- Rebellion, machismo, and violence
- Despair, burnout, and dropout

Conclusion

The crisis of identity and powerlessness is a personal crisis for activists. After the experience of a movement in take-off stage, their view of the world and themselves is transformed. They come to realize that the problem is more serious than they had thought, the governmental institutions, powerbrokers, and democratic processes which they thought would help solve social problems were actually part of the problem, and that the problem can only be resolved if they are part of the solution. Rather than feeling depressed and powerless, activists now need to recognize the power and success of themselves and their movement. The need to realize that their movement has successfully progressed to Stage Six, to the majority opinion stage, and they need to catch up to it by finding a role for themselves and the group in waging Stage Six.

Suggested Reading:

[The Movement Action Plan: A Strategic Framework Describing The Eight Stages of Successful Social Movements](#) by Bill Moyer, 1987

4. The three final stages

We provide a more in-depth look at stages six, seven and eight. In particular, we examine the tasks and pitfalls of stage six, “Building National Consensus” and how to navigate the 12 phases, describe the mechanisms of success and what the movement does after success.

Slides:

Goals of lecture

After this lecture, you will be able to:

- Understand the general tasks of Stages Six, Seven and Eight.
- Know how to navigate the phases of Stage Six.
- Explain the mechanisms of success.
- Describe the next steps of the movement after success.



Stage Six: Building National Consensus

Overview:

- Move from a protest movement to a long-term campaign.
- Win over and involve more people – go mainstream.
- Erode the power holders’ pillars of support.
- Nurture the grassroots.
- Develop a Grand Strategy for winning.



Long term campaigns

This involves the hard work of day-to-day organizing:

- Low-intensity local organizing
- Educate and convert all segments of the population
- Build a movement of movements
- Use of mainstream political and social institutions to increase awareness of the issue and win where possible.
- Nonviolent actions at critical times and places.
- Constructive programs.
- Respond to trigger events.



Empowerment Organizing Model

Develop greater structure but avoid becoming a “Professional Opposition Organization” or “POO”

Put structures in place that are consistent with your principles – that practice democracy, that include all voices

Be “nurturing mothers” to the grassroots – you cannot exist without them



Grand Strategy

- Keep the issue in the spotlight – keep telling the truth
- Identify all of your demands, map them separately and develop campaigns for each.
- Stop the power holders from winning.
- Shift the paradigm.
- Stay flexible to keep building your capacity and reducing the power holders’ capacity



What the Power Holders Do

- Use new terms, myths and threats to erode public support for the movement.
- Discredit, disrupt, divert and coopt (claim to be) the movement.
- Develop new strategies to achieve their goals.
- Double down on their policy as the solution, appear to be responding to and negotiating with the public.



Pitfalls of Stage Six

- Activists become stuck in the protest stage.
- Movement violence, rebelliousness, and macho radicalism.
- Believing that the movement is losing and local efforts are futile.
- National organizations and leadership disenfranchise grassroots activists by dominating the movement.
- Cooptation by powerholders through collusion and compromise.
- Political sects dominate the movement organizations.



Phases of Stage Six

1. Keep the issues on the political and social agenda;
2. Win supermajority support against current conditions and policies;
3. Cause powerholders to change strategy although they do not solve problems;
4. Counter each change in strategy by showing it is a gimmick, not a solution;
5. Push powerholders to new strategies that take riskier positions and make it harder to hold old positions;
6. Create strategic campaigns that erode support for the powerholders;



Phases of Stage Six

7. Expand policy goals as the movement realizes the problems are greater than was evident;
8. Develop stronger and deeper opposition to current conditions and policies;
9. Promote solutions and a paradigm shift;
10. Win supermajority support for the movement's solutions;
11. Put the issues on the political and legal agendas;
12. Finally, the powerholders change positions to appear to get in line with public opinion while attacking the movement and its solutions.



The Crisis Point

Opposition to current policies grows quickly.

↓

Support for alternative policy rises (movement helps this process)

↓

Everyone wants the issue resolved, but government is unable to take action.

↓

At the end of Stage 6, many powerholders begin to join the calls for change.

↓

As elites defect to support majority opinion, the political price paid by those who want to maintain unpopular policies exceeds their benefits and creates a political crisis that leads to resolution.



End of Stage Six

By the end, there is supermajority support for the movement's goal, from 65% to 85%.

The public is evenly split in support for changing the status quo. Half support and half fear the alternative.



Stage Seven: Success

Opposition is on the offensive and must stay involved until victory is achieved.

Three mechanisms of success:

- Revolution
- Victorious Retreat
- Attrition



What the Power Holders Do

As people become more upset by current conditions, they overcome their fear of change and become active.

At this point, power holders may:

- be forced into making fatal mistakes.
- be prevented from carrying out their policies.
- resort to acts of repression that grow the movement.



What the Movement Does

- Wage a successful "endgame" strategy to achieve one or more demands.
- Have activists recognize the success and their own role in it.
- Raise larger issues and propose alternative paradigms.
- Create new decentralized centers of power based on more participatory structures and an empowered public.
- Continue the movement.



What to Avoid Doing

- Compromising too many values and key demands.
- Achieving minor reforms without building toward basic social change.
- Having activists feel dismayed and powerless because they do not recognize success and the movement's role in a successful endgame.
- Having apparent final victory end the movement.



Stage Eight: Continuing the Struggle

Tasks:

- Watchdog and defend the gains.
- Create new campaigns for the next demands.
- Build toward fundamental structural changes.



Transformational Change

- (1) Create empowered people who become life-long social change agents, and not just one issue protesters
- (2) Create ongoing grassroots political organizations and networks
- (3) Broaden the analysis, issues, and goals of movements
- (4) Propose new alternatives and worldviews or paradigms that put forward new political and social systems, not just oppose symptoms.

"There is no end, there is only continuing struggle."

- Bill Moyer



Relevant Sections from Bill Moyer's Movement Action Plan:

STAGE SIX: MAJORITY PUBLIC SUPPORT

The movement must consciously undergo a transformation from spontaneous protest, operating in a short-term crisis, to a long-term popular struggle to achieve positive social change. It needs to win over the neutrality, sympathies, opinions, and even support of an increasingly larger majority of the populace and involve many of them in the process of opposition and change. The central agency of opposition must slowly change from the new wave activists and groups to the great majority of nonpolitical populace, the PPOs, and the mainstream political forces as they are convinced to agree with the movement's position. The majority stage is a long process of eroding the social, political, and economic supports that enable the powerholders to continue their policies. It is a slow process of social transformation that create a new social and political consensus, reversing those of normal times.

Although movements need to organize both nationally and locally, they are only

as powerful as the power of their grassroots. All the national offices in Washington, D.C., The Movement Action Plan 27 can do is "cash in" on the social and political gains created at the community level all over the country. The movement's chief goal, therefore, is to nurture, support, and empower grassroots activists and groups. Finally, activists also need to have a grand strategy for waging Stage Six majority movements to win positive social changes against the strong opposition of the powerholders.

Opposition

The opposition needs to wage a Stage Six strategy. Too often strategy has meant a calendar of events, an assorted number of unconnected campaigns, and reactions to new governmental policies. A Stage Six strategy includes a set of strategic programs, new organizational and leadership models, and an overall grand strategy.

Strategic Programs

- Ongoing low-intensity local organizing. The key to Stage Six success ultimately is the ongoing, day-in and day-out basic efforts of grassroots local activists—public speaking, information tables at supermarkets, leafletting, yard sales, and so on—all involving face-to-face education of citizens by their peers and keeping the issue before the public.
- Massive public education and conversion. The basic purpose of the movement in this stage is to educate, convert, and involve all segments of the population. This is accomplished through a broad variety of means, including the mass media. Most important, however, are direct contacts through the low-intensity activities at the local level, through sidewalk tables, demonstrations, leaflets, petitions, housemeetings, literature, and bumper stickers. The issue needs to be re-defined to show how it directly affects everyone's values and self-interests and what they can do about it.
- Build a broad-based pluralized movement. The movement needs to include all segments of the population through coalitions, networks, co-sponsorship of events and petitions, and directly involving all constituency groups, example, unemployed, Blacks, workers, teachers, Hispanics, religious,

women, students, etc. This includes movement organizations within each constituency such as Women for Peace and Teachers for Social Responsibility. In addition, the movement needs groups in all three categories—professional opposition organizations, new wave grassroots, and principled dissent. The different movement organizations must be allies with each other, overcoming the tendency towards self-righteousness, animosity, and divisiveness.

- Renewed use of mainstream political and social institutions. As the movement wins larger majorities of public opinion, mainstream channels (e.g., Congress, city councils, officials, election campaigns, candidates, courts, official commissions and hearings, and ballot referenda) are used with increasing effectiveness. While they serve to build the movement—keeping the issue in the public spotlight, educating the public, and so on—they also win actual victories on demands where there is big public support in places where the movement is strongest and the central powerholders weakest, often at the local and state levels. These successes serve to build the movement's success from the ground up over the coming years. For example, the opposition to U.S. direct military invasion of Nicaragua has been (at least temporarily) successful at the Congressional level, but not at the central powerholder level of the Reagan administration. And nuclear energy plans have been halted at the local and state levels, while the central government and nuclear industry maintain their policies favoring increased use of nuclear power. Also, the opposition to nuclear weapons has been built into a national consensus, which is putting enormous pressure on the national government. Even President Reagan has tried to appear to be ending nuclear weapons, especially U.S. missiles in Europe, where there is overwhelming public opposition.
- Nonviolent rallies, demonstrations, and campaigns, especially at critical times and places. Although the movement now includes a wide range of programs, it must continue to have nonviolent actions, rallies, and campaigns, with occasional civil disobedience. While nonviolent actions should be held at traditional times and places, such as on Hiroshima and Nagasaki days, they should also occur at critical times and places, such as when Congress votes on aid to the contras, when dictators visit, and during

re-trigger events, such as the Chernobyl accident. Because people are involved in so many different programs in this stage, and many no longer see the purpose of some nonviolent actions, the numbers participating in any specific national or local demonstration usually drop below those of the take-off stage (with the exception of some new crises). However, because there are nonviolent actions happening in hundreds of local communities around the country when movements are in the majority stage, the nationwide total number participating in demonstrations actually increases enormously in this stage.

Although nonviolent actions sometimes do help win immediate successes, such as change a city council member's or Congressperson's vote, their chief purpose is to help achieve many of the goals of Stages Four to Six, such as keeping the issue in the public spotlight and providing a platform for the movement to educate the public.

- Citizen involvement programs. The movement needs to develop programs in which large numbers of common citizens can become actively involved in programs that challenge current traditions, policies, and laws, while simultaneously carrying out the society's values and the movement's alternatives. This empowers the movement and citizens because they can carry out their values and goals without waiting for the powerholders to make the decision for them. This is quite different from isolated alternative "demonstration" projects. Citizen involvement programs put large numbers of people directly in contradiction with official policies. Some excellent massive citizen involvement programs of today's movements include the sanctuary movement, in which local churches and towns throughout the country provide official sanctuary for Central American political refugees; the thousands of "citizen diplomats" traveling to Russia and Nicaragua; sending tools and aid to Nicaragua in violation of U.S. sanctions; and nuclear free towns, counties, and even countries, such as New Zealand and Palau. These programs educate and convert the public, demonstrate the alternative values and policies sought, demonstrate the extent of popular opposition, undercut the authority of the powerholders to carry out their policy goals, and build change from the bottom up.

- Respond to new trigger events, such as the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, to again put the issue in the public spotlight, educate the public to new levels of awareness, build the movement organizations, and increase the pressure for change.

New empowerment organization and leadership model

Movement organizations must switch from the "loose" to the "empowerment" model. The loose organization model was highly appropriate at the beginning of the new movement. It allowed for creative, spontaneous activities, which included civil disobedience and quick, flexible, and direct decision-making by all involved. But after six months the loose structure rapidly becomes a liability. It becomes too inefficient, people burn out from long meetings, the most experienced and strongest activists become dominant leaders, new people have difficulty becoming full participants, and the whole organization evolves into a informal hierarchy. The empowerment organization model is the name given to a new structure that activists must construct themselves, in which they try to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of the hierarchical and loose models. Its goal is to be participatory democratic, efficient, flexible, and capable of lasting over the long haul. This requires more structures, but structures that assure these principles.

This is a critical time for the offices and staff of national movement organizations. While they need to advocate practical policies of "real politics", maintain the organization, and operate in bureaucracies (no matter how "collective"), they must prevent the organization from becoming a new POO, and the staff from becoming new movement elites. The primary goal is to serve, nurture, and empower the grassroots and to ensure that internal participatory democracy is carried out. The staff model must continue to be that of nurturing mothers, not dominant patriarchs. When the national staff behaves as if they are the movement, the grassroots dries up and the movement loses its power.

Grand Strategy

Activists need to develop a "grand strategy" for waging social movements in Stage Six. Lacking a viable strategy, most activists are unable to see a relationship

between their day-to-day activities and the accomplishment of the movement's goals. Some of the key elements are the following:

- Keep the issue in the public spotlight and on society's agenda over time. Keep the policies and conditions which violate the values, interests, and beliefs of the majority of the populace in the public spotlight. Over time, this helps build the social and political conditions for change because it helps fulfill Robert Jay Lifton's view that the way to get rid of a social delusion is to keep telling the truth. The present social movements against nuclear weapons and in opposition to U.S. intervention in Central America should recognize as tremendous success the fact that these issues have been kept in the public spotlight and on society's social and political agendas for a number of years.
- Identify all of the movement's key goals and identify which stage each is in and develop strategies to achieve them. Identify the movement's full range of demands, from the very specific to the general, such as end all nuclear weapons, stop nuclear testing, stop Star Wars, and stop U.S. Euromissiles. Strategies, submovements, and campaigns need to be developed for each of these major demands. Activists should identify which MAP stage the movement is in for each of these demands and develop strategies, submovements, and campaigns to achieve each major demand. For example, stop U.S. direct invasion of Nicaragua might be in Stage Seven, official support for the contras in Stage Six, and a positive Contadora peace resolution for all of Central America is possibly just in Stage Three.
- Counter the powerholders' strategy. The movement needs to identify the powerholders' long-term goals, strategies, and programs and develop counterstrategies against each one. For example, the U.S. is considering invading Nicaragua, supporting the contra's war against Nicaragua, preventing a meaningful peaceful Contadora resolution, etc. The movement needs to develop campaigns to prevent the government's achieving each of these objectives.
- Beyond reforms: propose alternatives, larger demands, and a new paradigm. The movement now needs not only to protest present policies but also to propose specific alternatives. In the process of struggle, people act their way into thinking, and they learn that the problem is much bigger than they had

thought. They come to realize that their original concerns were merely symptoms of much bigger and deeper problems; consequently, the movement needs to make larger demands. This ultimately includes the necessity for a whole new worldview or paradigm. The movement against Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe, for example, realized that they needed to remove all nuclear weapons from East and West Europe. This has led a new worldview of a nuclear free East and West Europe that will become increasingly neutral and independent of the Soviet-United States superpower bloc system.

- Guide the movement through the dynamics of conflict with the powerholders. Waging a social movement is similar to playing chess. The movement and powerholders constantly engage in moves and countermoves to win the public and build conditions to support their own position. The movement tries to build moral, political, and economic conditions that will erode the support that enables the powerholders to continue their policies. The powerholders keep changing their policies to keep their capacity to maintain the status quo. The movement's goal is to keep weakening the powerholders' position and raising the price that they must pay to continue their policies. The Reagan administration, for example, seemed about to invade Nicaragua in 1984, but the anti-intervention movement raised public opposition to a new level. The government then switched its chief focus to supporting the contras, but the movement made this illegal by helping pass the Boland amendment, thereby forcing the government to undertake the high-risk policies of illegal and unconstitutional covert aid through Ollie North. This has weakened President Reagan's capacity to wage his policies in Central America as well as elsewhere.

Powerholders

The powerholders launch a hardline conflict management strategy to defend their policies, which included the following:

- Promote new rhetoric and myths and re-emphasize the threat of outside demons, such as terrorism and Communism, to try to rally an increasingly skeptical public.

- Increase their counter-movement strategy to gather intelligence; discredit the movement; cause internal disruption, control, and steer the movement; preempt it by claiming to do the movement's program (e.g., "Star Wars will end nuclear weapons"); and try to co-opt the movement under mainstream political control (e.g., co-sponsor grossly watered down Congressional bills).
- Engage in the dynamics of conflict with the movement by switching strategies, stance, and policies as needed, for example, from invading Nicaragua with U.S. troops, to supporting the proxy contras and waging low-intensity warfare against Nicaragua.
- Publicly appear to be engaged in a meaningful "negotiation process", while actually carrying out operative policies and doctrines without giving up any important advantages. Powerholders keep pronouncing that their policies are correct and winning. Finally, splits begin happening within the power structure, as over time pressure from the new social and political consensus force increasing portions of the mainstream political, economic and social elites to switch their position, even openly oppose the policies of the central powerholders in order to protect their own self-interests. The issue is now hotly contested within Congress, the Administration, and all other political levels.

Public

Public opinion opposing the powerholders' policies grows to as much as 65 percent within a few years, and then, over many years, slowly swells to a large majority of up to 85 percent. The populace, however, is evenly split over wanting a change in the status quo. Half fear the alternatives more than they oppose the present conditions and policies. By the early 1970s, for example, 83 percent of Americans called for an end to the Vietnam war, and currently 65 percent oppose aid to the contras and U.S. military intervention in Central America.

Goals

- Keep the issue and the powerholders' values violations in the public spotlight and on society's agenda.

- Switch from only crisis protest to waging protracted social struggle to achieve positive social change.
- Gear efforts to the public to keep winning a bigger majority opinion.
- Involve large numbers of the populace in programs at the grassroots level.
- Propose alternatives, more demands, and a new paradigm.
- Have activists able to use a strategic framework such as MAP. 32 Bill Moyer
- Adopt empowerment organizational and leadership models.

Pitfalls

- Activists become stuck in the protest stage.
- Movement violence, rebelliousness, and macho radicalism.
- Believing that the movement is losing and local efforts are futile.
- National organizations and leadership disenfranchise grassroots activists by dominating the movement.
- Cooptation by powerholders through collusion and compromise.
- Political sects dominate the movement organizations.

Conclusions

Over many years, perhaps decades, public opinion against the powerholders' policies swells to an overwhelming majority of up to 85 percent, as was opposition to the Vietnam War. Almost every sector of society eventually wants to end the problem and current policies—most politicians, the Democratic Party, celebrities, professionals, students, Middle America, youth, the unemployed, local governments, and the general population. But strangely, nothing seems to change. The problem continues, Congress seems unable to make decisive votes, and the central powerholders continue their policies, although with cosmetic changes. Moreover the movement appears to be in a lull. There are demonstrations, meetings, and activists, but they seem small, routine, and mechanical, as the movement's position has been adopted by the mainstream of society. Over the

years, however, the weight of the massive public opposition, along with the defection of many elites, eventually takes its toll. The political price that the powerholders have to pay to maintain their policies grows to become an untenable liability.

STAGE SEVEN: SUCCESS

Stage Seven begins when the long process of building opposition reaches a new plateau in which the new social consensus turns the tide of power against the powerholders and begins an endgame process leading to the movement's success. The Stage Seven process can take three forms: dramatic showdown, quiet showdown, or attrition.

- Dramatic showdown resembles the take off stage. A sudden trigger event sparks a mobilization of broad popular opposition and a social crisis, but this time the overwhelming coercive force, in a relatively short time, changes policies or leadership. This was achieved in each issue of the early 1960s civil rights movement, such as when the Selma march started President Johnson and the Congress into motion that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 within a few months. Activists usually feel that they won and had played an important role in achieving success.
- Quiet showdown. Realizing that they can no longer continue their present policies, the powerholders launch a face-saving endgame process of "victorious retreat". Rather than admit defeat, they proclaim victory and start a publicly recognized process of changing their policies and conditions to those demanded by the movement and social consensus. The powerholders try to take credit for this "victory", even though they were forced to reverse their previously hardline policies, while activists often have difficulty seeing their role in this success. A current example is President Reagan's efforts to reach an agreement with Gorbachev to end Euromissiles.
- Attrition is when success is quietly and seemingly invisibly achieved in a long process which could take decades, in which social and political machinery slowly evolves new policies and conditions, such as the present winding down of nuclear energy in the United States. During the attrition process, activists usually have even more difficulty recognizing the successful

endgame process and the fact that they had a crucial role in causing it. In all three forms, once the endgame process starts, final success is not guaranteed. Until the change is finally actually accomplished, the situation can be reversed. Stage Seven involves a continual struggle, but one in which the opposition is on the offensive until the specific goal is won.

Opposition

The chief engine for change switches from the "movement" to traditional progressives; the "nonpolitical" majority of the population; and mainstream political, social, and economic groups and institutions. The public becomes involved in a broad range of social actions which keep the spotlight on the issues, reveals the evils of the present policies, and creates real political and economic penalties. Most of the business and political powerholders are forced to defect from their ties to the status quo, because it is in their self-interest. The penalty for defending the status quo has become bigger than for accepting the alternative. The politicians will face hostile voters at their next election, and the business community can suffer loss of profits or business community can suffer loss of profits or business through boycotts, sanctions, and disruption of the marketplace. There sometimes is a general, worldwide insurrection which isolates the central powerholders and their dwindling support.

The opposition's efforts and feelings vary according to the endgame form:

- In dramatic showdown, the movement more resembles the take-off stage, in which it plays a massive, publicly obvious role involving mass-demonstrations in a time of crisis leading to success in a relatively short time, such as the toppling of Marcos, following the election process, or the achievement of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, five months after the Selma campaign.
- In quiet showdown, the movement continues its strategy and of both take-off and Stage Six, and while still publicly active, activists need to work hard to recognize the victory and their own role.

- In attrition, the endgame process is often not recognized as success, the movement's role is much less visible, and much of the opposition's efforts are carried out through the work of elites and the POOs.

Powerholders

The viability of the central powerholders' policies is eroded economically and politically. The majority of powerholders join the opposition view, while the central powerholders are isolated and eventually defeated. The central powerholders are:

- forced into making fatal mistakes, such as President Nixon's ordered Watergate break-ins and other "dirty tricks" against the opposition, or when President Reagan felt forced to violate the Boland amendment through illegal covert aid to the contras;
- increasingly prevented from doing what is fully required to successfully carry out their policies, such as when the Pentagon was prevented from carrying out programs it felt were necessary to win the Vietnam War; and
- resort to extreme emergency acts of political and economic decrees and repression, which serve only to spur the opposition. The economic, social, and political penalties erode the base for support of the powerholders to either continue their policies or remain in office. The central powerholders have three different endgame strategies, according to the type of ending:
 - Custer's last stand (in dramatic showdown), in which they hold out until either their policies are defeated in the mainstream political process, such as in the courts, Congress, or referenda, or they lose their office or position through elections or mass social actions and pressures;
 - Victorious retreat (in quiet showdown), in which the powerholders lose on the issue, but in reversing their policies declare victory for themselves; or of
 - Persistent stubbornness (in attrition), in which they hold out in an increasingly losing cause over many years, until one of the above two endings occur.

Public

The public demands change. The opposition to the powerholders is now so overwhelming that the whole issue is publicly recognized as the "good guys vs. bad guys". One is either for decency or for President Marcos, apartheid, and the Vietnam War. While a majority opposition has existed for some years, up to now the mass population was not willing to act on their beliefs. They had not acted because they:

- felt powerless,
- did not know what to do,
- were not called to action by a trigger event and crisis, and
- feared the alternative (e.g., Communism, or the unknown) more than they desired change.

Citizens are so repulsed that their desire to end present policies and conditions overtakes their worry about the consequences of the alternative.

They are ready to vote, demonstrate, and even support the central powerholders in changing present policies. For example, people want an end to nuclear weapons more than they fear Soviet attack and takeover.

Goals

The movement's goals for this stage include:

- Wage a successful "endgame" strategy to achieve one or more demands.
- Have activists recognize the success and their own role in it.
- Raise larger issues and propose alternative paradigms.
- Create new decentralized centers of power based on more participatory structures and an empowered public.
- Continue the movement.

Pitfalls

The movement needs to avoid:

- compromising too many values and key demands;
- achieving minor reforms without building toward basic social change;
- having activists feel dismayed and powerless because they do not recognize success and the movement's role in a successful endgame; and
- having apparent final victory end the movement.

Conclusion

The movement finally achieves one or more of its demands. It now needs to address some hard questions: What is success? What needs to be done next? The movement needs to recognize successes achieved, follow up on the demands won, raise larger issues, focus on other demands which are in various stages, and propose larger alternatives and a new paradigm.

STAGE EIGHT: CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE

The success achieved in Stage Seven is not the end of the struggle but a basis for continuing that struggle and creating new beginnings.

Opposition

The movement has to continue the struggle in five different ways:

- Celebrate success. The successes of Stage Seven and the movement's role in achieving them should be clearly recognized by activists.
- Follow-up. There needs to be follow-up, mainly by the POOs, at the local and national level (1) to make sure that the new promises, laws, and policies are actually carried out (e.g., after the 1965 Voting Rights Act a major effort was required to assure that Blacks were actually allowed to vote); (2) to achieve additional successes, which are now possible under the new political conditions and legal mandate; and (3) to resist backlash which might reverse the new gains.

- Work on achieving other demands. The movement needs to focus on achieving other demands, which are probably in earlier MAP stages. After the civil rights movement desegregated restaurants in 1960, for example, the whole MAP stages process was repeated with successive movements to achieve integrated buses, equal public accommodations, voting rights, and work to end poverty.
- New social consciousness, issues, and movements. The modern student and women's movements emerged out of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements.
- Beyond reform to social change. Social movements need to go beyond immediate reforms to build toward fundamental structural changes by (1) creating empowered people who become life-long social change agents, and not just one issue protesters; (2) creating ongoing grassroots political organizations and networks; (3) broadening the analysis, issues, and goals of movements; (4) propose new alternatives and worldviews or paradigms that put forward new political and social systems, not just oppose symptoms.

Powerholders

Governmental bureaucracies are supposed to carry out new laws and directives but could drag their feet and even fail to follow through. While most powerholders will be part of the new social and political consensus and try to carry out the new laws and policies, some may counterattack to reverse the new successes, as the Reagan administration did in ignoring the Boland amendment and continuing its support of the contras after 1984.

Public

A new social consensus of about 80 percent of the populace supports the favorable resolution of the movement's demand and the resulting new policies and conditions. The new demands on which the movement now begins focusing are supported by between 10 and 80 percent of the public and are different MAP stages.

Goals

The movement's goals are to assure that the demands achieved are maintained and to circle back to focus the movement on other demands.

Pitfalls

The chief hazards of Stage Eight are having the new successes either inadequately implemented or revoked from backlash.

Conclusion

There is no end. There is only the continuing struggle, acted out in cycles of social movements. The process of winning one set of demands creates new levels of citizen consciousness and empowerment, and generates new movements on new demands and issues.

Peoples' movements move the world further along the path towards more fully meeting the spiritual, physical, social, and political needs of humanity. Moreover, the very process of being fully involved in the struggle of peoples' movements contributes to peoples' political and spiritual fulfillment. Activists are part of the emerging people-power movements around the world. People worldwide are struggling to transform themselves and the world from the present era of superpowers, materialism, environmental breakdown, disenfranchisement, abject poverty amidst opulence, and militarism, to a new, more human era of democracy, freedom, justice, self-determination, human rights, peaceful coexistence, preservation of the environment, and the meeting of basic human needs.

Consequently, the long-term impacts are more important than their immediate successes. The civil rights movement, for example, created a new positive image of Blacks among themselves and whites, established nonviolent action as a means to achieve people power, directly spun off the student and anti-Vietnam War movements, and inspired peoples' movements got the American people, for the first time, to challenge and change American foreign policy and created the "Vietnam syndrome" in which the American people oppose the century old policy of U.S. military intervention in Latin America to achieve the interests of American

powerholders. Social movements are also contagious: Philippines people's movement spurred similar efforts in Haiti, Chile, and now South Korea.

Suggested Reading:

[Real Change is Closer than you Think](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2013

[The Tasks of the People-Powered Movement](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2014

5. Roles of Individuals and Organizations

We review the four roles that individuals and organizations play in a social movement and what makes them more or less effective. We also discuss how coalitions function and basic principles for making them effective. Finally, we discuss the non-profit industrial complex.

Slides:

Goals of lecture	Four roles in Social Movements
<p>After this lecture, you will be able to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Describe the four roles in social movements.• Identify effective versus ineffective practices.• Discuss how coalitions function.• Understand strengths and weaknesses of Professional Opposition Organizations. <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>Principles:</p> <p>All four are necessary.</p> <p>Individuals and organizations can play more than one role.</p> <p>People and organizations may be best suited for a particular role.</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>

The Advocate (Reformer)

- Transmits movement analyses and goals to authorities.
- Performs legal efforts – lobbying, courts, etc.
- Works to create and expand new laws and policies.
- Acts as a watchdog to ensure the new laws and policies are funded and carried out.

Childhood – sought out authorities to solve problems.



The Helper (Citizen)

- Upholds a widely-held vision of the democratic, good society.
- Demonstrates ordinary people support social change.
- Gives the movement legitimacy.
- Makes it harder for authorities to discredit the movement.
- Reduces the potential for violent attitudes and actions.

Childhood – works to solve the problem through personal efforts.



The Organizer (Change Agent)

- Supports the involvement of large numbers of people in the process of addressing social problems.
- Promotes a new social and political majority consensus favoring positive solutions.
- Promotes democratic principles and human values.
- Supports the development of coalitions.
- Counters the actions of authorities.
- Moves society from reform to social change by promoting a paradigm shift.


Childhood – works to solve the problem collectively.



The Rebel

- Puts issues on the social and political agenda through dramatic, nonviolent actions.
- Dramatically illustrates social issues.
- Shows how institutions and official authorities violate public trust by causing and perpetuating critical social problems.
- Forces society to face its problems.
- Promotes democracy.

Childhood – raises a commotion to pressure powerholders to act.



Building Coalitions

Unite by a common goal.

Different groups play different roles.

Maintain basic communication and coordination with each other.

Respect autonomy of different groups.

Each group acts to optimize its strengths.



Jemez Principles for Democratic Organizing

1. Be inclusive
2. Emphasis on bottom-up organizing
3. Let people speak for themselves
4. Work together in solidarity and mutuality
5. Build just relationships
6. Commitment to self-transformation



Conflicts

Important to maintain solidarity and not let power holders divide the movement. Conflict can be constructive.

Conflict can take a stagnant group and move it to a stronger level.

Three phases of groups:

1. **Honeymoon** – superficial polite efforts to get the job done.
2. **Chaos** – fighting.
3. **Community** – creates a high-performance team, happens when members accept diversity on a deeper level.



Professional Opposition Organizations “POOs”

The professional opposition organizations are centralized formal organizations, often with national offices in Washington, D.C., which try to win achievable reforms through mainstream political channels such as the electoral process, Congress, and the courts. They are hierarchical, with a board of directors, strong staff, and a mass membership that carries out nationally decided programs. These efforts have little success because they do not have sufficient public support to provide the political clout required to create change.



Non-Profit Industrial Complex

Limitations:

Funding may dictate their positions.

May be more likely to compromise or protect status quo.


May function as ineffective reformers

Mainstream organizations that can be useful to the movement for resources, exposure, expertise and access.

Role of the movement is to pull them towards a position of principled dissent.



Roles throughout the Stages



The four roles of activism (by Andreas Speck, from War Resisters' International)

The second central concept of the MAP are the four roles of activism. Each of these roles has its own relevance, which can shift through the different stages of a movement. But all roles need to be present and work efficiently for the movement to succeed. In addition, each of the roles can be filled in an effective or ineffective way.

The rebel is the kind of activist many people identify with social movements. Through nonviolent direct actions and publicly saying “no”, rebels put the problem on the political agenda. But they can be ineffective by identifying themselves as the lonely voice on society's fringe and playing the militant radical.

Rebels are important in Stages 3 and 4 and after any trigger event, but they usually move over to other ripening movements in Stage 6 or later.

Reformers are often badly valued in movements, but they are the ones who prove the failure of existing channels or promote alternative solutions. However, they often tend to believe in the institutions or propose reforms too small to consolidate the movement's success.

Citizens make sure the movement doesn't lose contact with its main constituency. They show that the movement acts at the centre of society (teachers, physicians, and farmers participating in the Gorleben protests), and protect it against oppression. They can be ineffective when they still believe in the powerholders' claim to serve public interests.

The change agent is the fourth and somehow key role in any movement. They promote education and convince the majority of society, they organise grassroots networks and promote long-term strategies. They too can be ineffective by promoting utopian visions or advocating only a single approach. They also tend to ignore personal issues and needs of activists.

Many activists and groups identify primarily with only one or two of the four roles, because each involves different emotions and attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, sources of funding, political and, often, organisational arrangements. Activists can be critical - or even hostile - to those playing other roles. Activists tend to consider the roles they play as the most important and politically correct one, while viewing other roles as naive, politically incorrect, ineffective, or, even, as the enemy.

While there are certainly tensions between the different roles, recognising that each has its own value within a social movement is important to achieve success.

Coalition Building (Brad Spangler, Beyond Intractability)

What is Coalition Building?

A coalition is a temporary alliance or partnering of groups in order to achieve a common purpose or to engage in joint activity. Coalition building is the process by which parties (individuals, organizations, or nations) come together to form a

coalition. Forming coalitions with other groups of similar [values](#), interests, and goals allows members to combine their resources and become more powerful than when they each acted alone.

Why is Coalition Building Important?

The "ability to build coalitions is a basic skill for those who wish to attain and maintain power and influence." Through coalitions, weaker parties to a conflict can increase their power. Coalition building is the "primary mechanism through which disempowered parties can develop their power base and thereby better defend their interests." Coalitions may be built around any issue and at any scale of society, from neighborhood issues to international conflict.

The formation of a coalition can shift the balance of power in a conflict situation and alter the future course of the conflict. People who pool their resources and work together are generally more powerful and more able to advance their interests, than those who do not. Coalition members may be able to resist certain threats or even begin to make counter threats. Generally, low-power groups are much more successful in defending their interests against the dominant group if they work together as a coalition. This is certainly more effective than fighting among themselves and/or fighting the dominant group alone.

How Do You Build a Successful Coalition?

Building a successful coalition involves a series of steps. The early steps center on the recognition of compatible interests. Sometimes this happens naturally. Other times potential coalition members must be persuaded that forming a coalition would be to their benefit. To do this one needs to demonstrate

1. that your goals are similar and compatible,
2. that working together will enhance both groups' abilities to reach their goals, and
3. that the benefits of coalescing will be greater than the costs.

What are the Benefits of Coalitions?

The benefits of coalition building go beyond increased power in relation to the opposition. Coalition building may also strengthen the members internally,

enabling them to be more effective in other arenas. Some other key advantages to coalition building include:

- A coalition of organizations can win on more fronts than a single organization working alone and increase the potential for success.
- A coalition can bring more expertise and resources to bear on complex issues, where the technical or personnel resources of any one organization would not be sufficient.
- A coalition can develop new leaders. As experienced group leaders step forward to lead the coalition, openings are created for new leaders in the individual groups. The new, emerging leadership strengthens the groups and the coalition.
- A coalition will increase the impact of each organization's effort. Involvement in a coalition means there are more people who have a better understanding of your issues and more people advocating for your side.
- A coalition will increase available resources. Not only will physical and financial resources be increased, but each group will gain access to the contacts, connections, and relationships established by other groups.
- A coalition may raise its members' public profiles by broadening the range of groups involved in a conflict. The activities of a coalition are likely to receive more media attention than those of any individual organization.
- A coalition can build a lasting base for change. Once groups unite, each group's vision of change broadens and it becomes more difficult for opposition groups to disregard the coalition's efforts as dismissible or as special interests.
- A successful coalition is made up of people who have never worked together before. Coming from diverse backgrounds and different viewpoints, they have to figure out how to respect each other's differences and get something big accomplished. They have to figure out how each group and its representatives can make their different but valuable contributions to the overall strategy for change. This helps avoid duplication of efforts and improve communication among key players.

Disadvantages of Working in Coalition

- Member groups can get distracted from other work. If that happens, non-coalition efforts may become less effective and the organization may be weakened overall.
- A coalition may only be as strong as its weakest link. Each member organization will have different levels of resources and experience as well as different internal problems. Organizations that provide a lot of resources and leadership may get frustrated with other members' shortcomings.
- To keep a coalition together, it is often necessary to cater to one side more than another, especially when negotiating tactics. If a member prefers high-profile confrontational tactics, they might dislike subdued tactics, thinking they are not exciting enough to mobilize support. At the same time, the low profile, conciliatory members might be alarmed by the confrontation advocates, fearing they will escalate the conflict and make eventual victory more difficult to obtain.
- The democratic principle of one group-one vote may not always be acceptable to members with a lot of power and resources. The coalition must carefully define the relationships between powerful and less-powerful groups.
- Individual organizations may not get credit for their contributions to a coalition. Members that contribute a lot may think they did not receive enough credit.

The Bottom Line

Deciding whether to join a coalition is both a rational and an emotional decision. Rationally, one must consider whether one's effectiveness and one's ability to attain one's own goals would be enhanced or harmed by participation in a coalition. Emotionally, one must consider whether one likes the other people or groups, and whether cooperating with them would be easy, or more trouble than it is worth. Usually when two people, groups, or organizations' goals are compatible, forming a coalition is to both groups' benefit. But organizational styles, cultures, and relationships must be considered as well before any choices are made.

Suggested Reading:

[What Role Were You Born to Play in Social Change?](#) By George Lakey, 2016.

[Building Our Muscles for Conflict](#) by George Lakey, 2013.

[Jemez Principles for Democratic Organizing](#), 1996.

6. Overcoming Obstacles

We review ways that movements are divided and taken off track, from intentional efforts to divide and conquer, as described by the corporate surveillance firm Stratfor, to co-optation, which can be insidious. We also discuss the relationship between electoral work and movements.

Slides:

<p>Goals of lecture</p> <p>After this lecture, you will be able to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Recognize divide and conquer strategies.• Understand how co-optation works.• Explain the role of electoral politics in movements. <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>Divide and Conquer Strategies</p> <p>Power holders divide movements by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Pitting people against each other.2. Giving privileges to particular groups.3. Threatening to withdraw privileges. <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>
<p>How Power Holders View Activists</p> <p>Four types of activists:</p> <p>Opportunists – are in it for themselves. They can be pulled away by promises of greater attention, better job or more power.</p> <p>Realists – can be convinced that they are not being pragmatic and will settle for reforms.</p> <p>Idealists – can be convinced that they are asking for too much and that their position isn't ethical.</p> <p>Radicals – see the system as corrupt and needing to be changed, they must be discredited and isolated.</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>Power Holders' Strategy</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Buy off the opportunists.2. Isolate the radicals.3. "Cultivate" the idealists and "educate" them into becoming realists.4. Co-opt the realists into agreeing with the power structure. Realists receive high priority because they are willing to make trade-offs as pragmatism dominates their thinking. <p>They also monitor movements to assess their level of organization and power.</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>

Counter Strategy

- Awareness of power holder's tactics so they can be exposed.
- Find ways to reward opportunists within the movement.
- Recognize value of radicals to maintain position of principled dissent.
- Support idealists.
- Maintain communication with realists to debate effectiveness of reforms – do they further the goal or weaken it?

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Resistance.org

Co-optation

A process by which a group subsumes or acculturates a smaller or weaker group with related interests; or, similarly, the process by which one group gains converts from another group by replicating some aspects of it without adopting the full program or ideal.

Popular
Resistance.org

Tactics of Co-optation: Channeling

Undermine and redirect the challenging movement's leadership and power base away from substantive challenges to the dominant groups or system and toward more modest reforms.

Popular
Resistance.org

Tactics of Co-optation: Inclusion and Participation

Actual participation of movement representatives on policy-making committees, state and local advisory bodies, institutionalized oversight agencies and boards, and in various schemes to design and implement new policies which are at best incrementally responsive to movement concerns.

Increases movement ownership of the status quo.
Undermines autonomy and depletes movement resources.

Paradox of collaboration.

Popular
Resistance.org

Tactics of Co-optation: Salience Control


Shifting the motivational relevance that various issues or grievances have for movement activists.

Belief that the problem is being addressed.

May contribute to erosion in movement mobilization and support for truly alternative initiatives.

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Stages of Co-optation



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Co-optation Stage 1

Inception/engagement – movement forms in response to a recognized problem, makes demands and builds alternatives. The power structure notices.

The state and vested interests, responding to external and internal pressures, begin to perceive a need for policy adjustments or even reform. In acknowledging the need for changes, political elites are often motivated by a host of different reasons, including genuine support for the policy change, efficiency concerns, repaying political favors, political expediency, reelection concerns, or a desire to blunt the challenge and head-off more substantive changes.

<https://www.mediate.com/articles/cohed3.cfm>

Popular
Resistance.org

Co-optation Stage 2

Appropriation of movement's language/critique with redefinition of the terms by the power structure in a way that betrays the movement's values. As the movement participates in power holders' structures, it gains legitimacy and resources.

Popular
Resistance.org

Co-optation Stage 3

Assimilation of the movement's people and goals, bring movement in to staff new structures. State regulates who can participate.

Assimilation brings new credibility and resources, but access to resources is contingent on serving the state and vested interests' needs, not the movement values and goals.



Co-optation Stage 4

Regulation - many initiatives and social services have been professionalized in an effort to create dependence upon experts, and to create the perception among individuals and communities that they are incapable of addressing their own needs.

Response – movement forms organizations to protect their interests as state regulates the institutions.



Avoiding Co-optation

"In relationships marked by power imbalances, cooperation and cooptation are nearly indistinguishable." - David Brubaker

- Awareness of the process of co-optation
- Commitment to the values and goals of the movement
- Regular strategic evaluation
- Willingness to push back when necessary



Co-optation by Political Parties

Political parties also co-opt movements for their purposes of staying in power and protecting the status quo.

Many of the same techniques are used:

Channeling
Inclusion and participation
Salience control



Role of Elections in Movements

Benefits:

Movement change political culture, which push party and candidate platforms

Elections are a vehicle for raising awareness of issues and solutions

Risks:

Avoid getting drawn into electoral work which replaces movement work

Avoid promoting the belief that we can "elect our way out of this."



'Radicals, Idealists, Realists, Opportunists' from "Here's How Corporations Defeat Political Movements"

While its client work was noteworthy, the formula Duchin created to divide and conquer activist movements — a regurgitation of what he learned while working under the mentorship of Rafael Pagan — has stood the test of time. It is still employed to this day by Stratfor.

Duchin replaced Pagan's "fanatic activist leaders" with "radicals" and created a three-step formula to divide and conquer activists by breaking them up into four subtypes, as described in a [1991 speech delivered to the National Cattleman's Association](#) titled, "Take an Activist Apart and What Do You Have? And How Do You Deal with Him/Her?"

The subtypes: “radicals, idealists, realists and opportunists.”

Radical activists “want to change the system; have underlying socio/political motives’ and see multinational corporations as ‘inherently evil,’” [explained Duchin](#). “These organizations do not trust the ... federal, state and local governments to protect them and to safeguard the environment. They believe, rather, that individuals and local groups should have direct power over industry ... I would categorize their principal aims ... as social justice and political empowerment.”

The “idealist” is easier to deal with, according to Duchin’s analysis.

“Idealists...want a perfect world...Because of their intrinsic altruism, however, ... [they] have a vulnerable point,” [he told the audience](#). “If they can be shown that their position is in opposition to an industry ... and cannot be ethically justified, they [will] change their position.”

The two easiest subtypes to join the corporate side of the fight are the “realists” and the “opportunists.” By definition, an “opportunist” takes the opportunity to side with the powerful for career gain, Duchin explained, and has skin in the game for “visibility, power [and] followers.”

The realist, by contrast, is more complex but the most important piece of the puzzle, says Duchin.

“[Realists are able to] live with trade-offs; willing to work within the system; not interested in radical change; pragmatic. The realists should always receive the highest priority in any strategy dealing with a public policy issue.”

Duchin outlined a corresponding three-step strategy to “deal with” these four activist subtypes. First, isolate the radicals. Second, “cultivate” the idealists and “educate” them into becoming realists. And finally, co-opt the realists into agreeing with industry.

“If your industry can successfully bring about these relationships, the credibility of the radicals will be lost and opportunists can be counted on to share in the final policy solution,” Duchin outlined in closing his speech.

Bringing The ‘Duchin Formula’ To Stratfor

[Alvin Biscoe passed away in 1998](#) and [Jack Mongoven passed away in 2000](#). Just a few years later, MBD — now only Ronald Duchin and Jack’s son, Bartholomew or “Bart” — [merged with Stratfor in 2003](#).

A book by John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton — “[Trust Us, We’re Experts!](#)” — explains that MBD promotional literature boasted that the firm kept “extensive files [on] forces for change [which] can often include activist and public interest groups, churches, unions and/or academia.”

“A typical dossier includes an organization’s historical background, biographical information on key personnel, funding sources, organizational structure and affiliations, and a ‘characterization’ of the organization aimed at identifying potential ways to co-opt or marginalize the organization’s impact on public policy debates,” the authors proceeded to explain.

MBD’s “extensive files” on “forces for change” soon would morph into Stratfor’s “Global Intelligence Files” after the merger.

What’s clear in sifting through the “Global Intelligence Files” documents, which were obtained by WikiLeaks as a result of Jeremy Hammond’s December 2011 hack of Stratfor, is that it was a marriage made in heaven for MBD and Stratfor.

The “Duchin formula” has become a Stratfor mainstay, carried on by Bart Mongoven. [Duchin passed away in 2010](#).

In a [December 2010 PowerPoint presentation](#) to the oil company Suncor on how best to “deal with” anti-Alberta tar sands activists, Bart Mongoven explains how to do so explicitly utilizing the “radicals, idealists, realists and opportunists” framework. In that presentation, he places the various environmental groups fighting against the tar sands in each category and concludes the presentation by explaining how Suncor can win the war against them.

Bart Mongoven described the American Petroleum Institute as his “[biggest client](#)” in a January 2010 email exchange, lending explanation to his interest in environmental and energy issues.

Mongoven also appears to have realized something was off about Chesapeake Energy’s financial support for the Sierra Club, judging by November 2009 [email exchanges](#). It took “idealists” in the environmental movement a full 2

½ years to realize the same thing, after [Time magazine wrote a major investigation revealing the fiduciary relationship](#) between one of the biggest shale gas “fracking” companies in the U.S. and one of the country’s biggest environmental groups.

“The clearest evidence of a financial relationship is the note in the Sierra Club 2008 annual report that [American Clean Skies Foundation was a financial supporter that year](#),” [wrote Mongoven in an email](#) to the National Manufacturing Association’s vice president of communications, Luke Popovich. “According to McClendon, American Clean Skies Foundation was created by Chesapeake and others in 2007.”

Bart Mongoven also used the “realist/idealist” paradigm to [discuss climate change legislation’s chances for passage in a 2007 article](#) on Stratfor’s website.

“Realists who support a strong federal regime are drawn to the idea that with most in industry calling for action on climate change, there is no time like the present,” Mongoven wrote. “Idealists, on the other hand, argue that with momentum on their side, there is little that industry could do in the face of a Democratic president and Congress, and therefore time is on the environmentalists’ side. The idealists argue that they have not gone this far only to pass a half-measure, particularly one that does not contain a hard carbon cap.”

And how best to deal with “radicals” like Julian Assange, founder and executive director of WikiLeaks, and whistleblower Bradley Manning, who gave WikiLeaks the [U.S. State Department diplomatic cables](#), the [Iraq](#) and [Afghanistan war logs](#) and the “[Collateral Murder](#)” video? Bart Mongoven has a simple solution to “isolate” them, as suggested by Duchin’s formula.

“I’m in favor of using whatever trumped up charge is available to get [Assange] and his servers off the streets. And I’d feed that shit head soldier [Bradley Manning] to the first pack of wild dogs I could find,” [Mongoven wrote in one email exchange revealed by the “Global Intelligence Files.”](#) “Or perhaps just do to him whatever the Iranians are doing to our sources there.”

Indeed, the use of “trumped up charges” is often a way the U.S. government deals with radical activists, as demonstrated clearly during the days of the [FBI’s](#)

[Counter-Intelligence Program](#) during the 1960s, as well as in modern-day Occupy movement-related cases in [Cleveland](#) and [Chicago](#).

Selected Portions of “A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation”

Many of the alternative institutions founded in the 1970s and 1980s have been unable to sustain themselves over the long term due to a complex of factors. Increasing rationalization, routinization, centralization, and corporatism in U.S. social and economic life meant that community-based alternative institutions began their lives having to swim upstream against what was a decidedly swift social and economic current. George Ritzer (2000) has distilled these powerful currents into a representative one which he presciently calls “the McDonaldization of society.” Here efficiency and standardization reign as supreme values, shunting aside the particularized approaches of alternative movements and initiatives. As alternative approaches like neighborhood food banks, health centers, and community mediation centers increasingly cooperated with existing political institutions in the 1990s and gradually became more institutionalized, they also moderated their values, lost some of their community focus, and adapted their organizational structures. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of coercive isomorphism is particularly apt here. Coercive isomorphism refers to the influential role of powerful exogenous institutions and resource providers, particularly the state, in fostering or imposing the reproduction of organizational patterns and values which reinforce the status quo.

This review of the robust literature on cooptation underscores the multi-faceted nature of cooptation. Thus, in what follows we have utilized a four-stage model to depict cooptation so as to bring some conceptual coherence to what is a complicated process of social interaction. In order to more fully understand the entire process it is helpful to break cooptation down into its key parts. These conceptually discrete aspects are called stages and steps in an overall stage model of cooptation. We emphasize, however, that each step in the stage model is actually a process, not an episode. No step, and certainly no stage, is a one-time event and none are accomplished in a specific moment or as a consequence of a particular action or event. The overall process and the progression between stages are depicted in our chart as somewhat linear. But in reality there are often loop-backs, mutually or unilaterally aborted processes, and both short term as

well as extended periods without significant new developments. Such is the nature of all social interactions.

Insofar as cooptation is a process, it is also important to understand that there is seldom a grand plan designed by the state and/or those vested in the status quo to lead a challenging movement step by step down the path of cooptation. We are not arguing that in the late 1970s reformers and influential allies in the justice system decided collectively—or even individually—to engage the mediation movement in a cooptive process that would eventually result in the political emasculation and moral diminishment of community mediation. Such comprehensive, integrated, and long-range grand plans are rare enough in policy circles; even more rare is their effective implementation. We do think it reasonable to assume, however, that an intention to coopt mediation has been present at various points on the part of various actors within the state and those invested in the status quo. To think otherwise is ahistorical with regard to the legacies of earlier challenging movements.

In the section that immediately follows, we will describe each stage and step of the cooptation process that community mediation has undergone over the past 25 years. The first stage, inception, requires some context-setting.

Stage 1: Inception

In the first step of Stage One, social movements like community mediation arise partly in response to a set of grievances or unfulfilled needs that a segment of the population experience in a shared way (McAdam 1982). Frequently, these grievances are framed as an “injustice” (Gamson 1992) and are thus used to help mobilize constituents and sympathetic bystanders to work for particular goals (Marwell and Oliver 1984). Two key variables that help translate social grievances into the collective action of a social movement are the development of shared consciousness and collective identities (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Johnson 1999) and the presence of political opportunities (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001). Political opportunities are often present for challenging movements when events or broad social processes occur which undermine the assumptions on which the political status quo is reliant (McAdam 1982). Wars, riots, prolonged unemployment, political realignments, court decisions, governmental scandals and transitions all may present opportunities for movement mobilization. Political

opportunities are present for varying lengths of time. Some are recognized by social movements and acted upon; others are missed, ignored, or deemed insufficient to mobilize around. Perception of opportunity is critical (Kurtzman 2003). Movements can also create additional opportunities, just as the civil rights movement and the peace movement helped create openings for the environmental movement.

Political opportunity structures are not static nor are they confined to institutions; there are strong cultural components to political opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Polletta 2003). For example, a growing distrust in government gripped the U.S. in the early 1970s; cultural values, myths, and narratives that had previously gone largely unquestioned were critically scrutinized. This was due in part to the success of the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, Watergate, widespread urban race riots, the excesses of the FBI in COINTELPRO, and the assassinations of JFK, MLK, and RFK. The loss of faith in the state combined with emergent collective identities and oppositional networks to contribute to the rise of widespread social mobilization, including the community mediation movement. A deep emotional dissatisfaction with government fused with a principled commitment to community-building. More specifically, mediation activists called into question the accessibility, responsiveness and fairness of the justice system.

In the late 1970s, activists desiring changes in the justice system insisted that citizens needed—and in a democracy, *deserved*—access to more avenues by which to resolve their disputes than a court system dominated by legal professionals (Wahrhaftig 1982; Schwerin 1995). This demand for change is the second step in Stage One. There were two primary prongs to this movement: a reform initiative that hoped to humanize the courts by creating multi-door courthouses where citizens could avail themselves of a judge, an arbitrator or a mediator according to their needs (Sander 1976); and a more community-focused impetus that concentrated on creating alternative or parallel institutions of dispute resolution that would keep most citizens out of the courthouse entirely while also building conflict management skills in neighborhoods (Davis 1991; Shonholtz 1993).

The creation of community mediation centers as a parallel institution represents the third step in Stage One. It is a significant step forward because it helps the

movement gain legitimacy insofar as actually creating alternative systems unmistakably demonstrates a significant outlay of community support, volunteerism, and material and emotional resources for a fledgling movement. Setting up alternative systems is a shot across the bow of the state and vested interests (SVI), signaling that the challenging movement is serious and not easily ignored; power relations even begin to shift in substantive ways (Sharp 1973, p. 398-401; 414-416).

The final step in Stage One occurs when various elements of the state and vested interests, responding to external and internal pressures, begin to perceive a need for policy adjustments or even reform. In acknowledging the need for changes, political elites are often motivated by a host of different reasons, including genuine support for the policy change, efficiency concerns, repaying political favors, political expediency, reelection concerns, or a desire to blunt the challenge and head-off more substantive changes. Of the many examples of this step present in the early years of the community mediation movement, we will mention three.

The 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, commonly known as the Pound Conference, was convened by Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger to confront the crisis of confidence facing the court system. It spawned considerable debate about the justice system.

Second, an important variable in social movement success is the presence of influential allies, sometimes located within the institutions targeted for change (Gamson 1990; Tarrow 1998). In his comments a year later at an American Bar Association gathering to address systemic problems in the criminal justice system, Warren Burger sounded less like the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and more like a rally organizer, or at least like the influential ally he was to become to the reform prong of the community mediation movement:

Unless we devise substitutes for the courtroom processes—and do so quickly—we may well be on our way to a society overrun by hordes of lawyers, hungry as locusts, and brigades of judges in numbers never before contemplated. We have reached the point where our systems of justice—both state and federal—may literally break down before the end of the century. (quoted in Galanter 1994)

There were still other insider allies for the nascent movement, including Attorney General Griffin Bell, who addressed issues of scale and costs in his call for change: “The traditional procedures of the courts are generally too slow and costly to be useful in resolving relatively minor disputes,” and thus, “the adversary process... is not always the best mechanism for resolving these disputes” (Bell 1978, p.320-1). Third, federal funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1970s and 1980s to diversify the dispute resolution services offered and to support court-affiliated neighborhood justice centers is yet another expression of this final step in Stage One.

Stage 2a Appropriation of language, technique

The second stage of cooptation includes two steps, both marked by appropriation. In the first step the language and methods of the challenging movement are appropriated, while in the second step the work of movement actors may be appropriated through invitations to participate in policymaking.

As noted previously, challenging movements often develop innovative/alternative processes to respond to perceived social problems. In the case of community dispute resolution, mediation and conciliation efforts were intended to empower the disputants, the volunteer service providers, and the community itself through programs administered outside the formal justice system (Coy and Hedeem 1998). The larger goals included improving the conflict resolution capacities of schools, churches, neighborhoods and social organizations while at the same time strengthening the role of the individual citizen in the exercise of democracy (Shonholtz 2000). Movement participants imagined a network of mediation programs where volunteer mediators would be peacemakers in their communities and help to reinvigorate the neighborhoods” (Beer 1986).

A new language evolved through the practice of community dispute resolution, as efforts both within and without the governmental justice system refined their services. Terms familiar and new were invoked: intake, mediation, co-mediation, caucus, problem-solving. While the discourse and technique of community dispute resolution has become widely employed in court systems (see, e.g., Van Epps 2002, Hensler 2003), the movement behind the language has been discounted, quite literally. Speaking at the annual conference of the American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution in Seattle in 2002, Judge Wayne D.

Brazil noted, “The term ‘movement’ in ‘ADR movement’ scares people” (Brazil 2002).

[T]here is a tone of “movement” about ADR that is off-putting to some. The “movement” is accompanied in some quarters by an air of radicalism in spirit and of ambition in claims that can inspire skepticism, distrust, disrespect, even fear—especially among heavily rationalistic and sometimes cynical judges, lawyers, and institutional litigants. (Brazil 2002, p.118)

While we suspect this fear has long been widespread in the legal community, it is seldom articulated, and almost never this explicitly. The concerns described so plainly by Judge Brazil demonstrate the general dismissal of community mediation’s social change agenda by the court system.

The appropriation of terminology to represent similar practices with different goals is but one step in stage two of the cooptation process; the second phase of appropriation includes re-definition of those terms. In 1983, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Michigan adopted innovative rules for alternative dispute resolution processes. Local Rule 41 held that “[t]he judges of this District favor initiation of alternative formulas for resolving disputes, saving costs and time, and permitting the parties to utilize creativity in fashioning non-coercive settlements,” while Rule 42 provided for a nonbinding process in which a panel of three attorney-neutrals consider thirty-minute presentations from each party and return an evaluation of the case. This highly truncated process, which bears little resemblance to community-based mediation practices, is known as “Michigan mediation” (Plapinger and Stienstra 1996, p.158). It is particularly noteworthy that the Federal Court for the Eastern District of Michigan provides only fifteen minutes per party. This approach to mediation, which raises the specter of assembly-line justice” (Drake and Lewis 1988, p. 4), is antithetical to the values undergirding the community mediation movement.

The emphasis on greater time-efficiency reflects broader social trends towards rationalization (Ritzer 2000), as well as narrower conceptions of the value of mediation. Alongside short turnaround times, referrals to mediation from various SVI channels, especially the courts, are tantamount to a simple disposal of the case (Harrington 1984). To attain settlements, many court-affiliated mediators employ “evaluative” approaches instead of “facilitative” ones (Riskin 1996),

offering their assessments of disputants' claims during mediation. Such directive activity is generally considered outside the bounds of community mediation practice (Beer 2003), yet "[u]ltimately, attorneys and the courts favor approaches to mediation that produce resolution—and mediator evaluation appears effective in reaching that goal" (Welsh 2004, p.591). Woolford and Ratner (2005) have persuasively argued that the hegemonic power of the legal system is such that the facilitative and transformative practices of community mediation will eventually "drift" toward the evaluative and directive approach to mediation that predominates within the legal system.

In the early 1990s, the Ohio Commission On Dispute Resolution and Conflict Resolution (a state agency) gave Capitol University a \$40,000 grant to produce a training video that promotes the "Seven Step Model of Mediation." The irony of this model is that it is focused on a constant caucus or shuttle diplomacy approach to mediation, where the parties themselves seldom communicate directly. While most community mediation centers also employ a phase or step model of mediation, each step is theoretically geared toward empowerment and is based on direct communication between the parties.

A more fundamental case of re-definition involves disputant participation in mediation. The voluntary nature of mediation is held to be fundamental to the process, as demonstrated by the prominent placement of self-determination as the first standard in the field's most widely recognized code of ethics, the *Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators* (1998): "A mediator shall recognize that mediation is based on the principle of self-determination by the parties." Even while community dispute resolution initiatives often suffered from low rates of usage (Beer 1986, Rogers 1992, Clarke et al. 1992), movement activists still placed considerable emphasis on the maintenance of voluntary participation in mediation.

Yet coerced participation is the maxim of the justice system which values cost and time efficiency (Shonholtz 1984; Nicolau 1995). Coercion toward participation takes numerous forms, from the use of Request to Appear forms nearly indistinguishable from a court summons to invitations to mediation on the letterhead of the local prosecutor (McGillis 1998, Hedeem and Coy 2000); in some cases the letters are signed by a local official and conclude with the threatening

line, “Failure to appear may result in the filing of criminal charges based on the above complaint” (McGillis and Mullen 1977, p.63).

Re-casting mediation as a compulsory process in the courts or other administrative milieux represents a departure from the goals of empowerment set forth by the challenging movement, an appropriation of a values-based process in which “voluntariness is vital” (Nicolau 1986). This appropriation benefits from and trades on the efforts of the challenging movement while simultaneously confusing the public understanding of the process (Hedeen and Coy 2000). Adler described the challenge for the movement:

As the institutions of government and business adopt ADR, community mediation programs will need to establish better working relations with those institutions and find creative ways to insure the incorporation, not just of the forms of ADR, but of the philosophic tenets that led to the start of community ADR programs in the first place. (1993, p.83)

Other observers describe the appropriation of the community mediation movement’s language and technique more concisely: “A lot of folks love our methods and process, but don’t give a damn about our values” (Herrman 1995).

Stage 2b Appropriation via Inclusion/Participation

One dimension of the appropriation of a social movement and its values is accomplished through various aspects of institutionalization. Murphree, Wright, and Ebaugh’s (1996, p. 452-460) research into a sustained but ultimately failed attempt to coopt community opposition to a toxic waste siting plan in Dayton, Texas has led them to identify three major components of cooptation, which they also see as “strategies used by coopting agents.” The three strategies (more properly conceived of as tactics) are: channeling, inclusion/participation, and salience control. We understand these three aspects to be closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

Channeling refers to efforts by the dominant group to undermine and redirect the challenging movement’s leadership and power base away from substantive challenges to the dominant groups or system and toward more modest reforms. Opposition movements are channeled by formalizing communications and negotiations into orderly and reliable channels that are set up by and controlled in

various degrees by state and vested interests. Centralized discussion and decision-making bodies are created where those vested in the status quo can concentrate their persuasion efforts to effectively neutralize key aspects of the challenge. For example, the Ohio state legislature created the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management in 1983 in order to promote the diffusion of dispute resolution across multiple sectors of social, political, and economic life in the state. In the 1990s, the Commission funded a group called the Ohio Conflict Management Network. Membership included virtually any type of organization remotely connected with mediation in Ohio: state government employees, court mediators, social service agencies, religious groups and some community –based mediation programs. The commission supplied the facilitator, convened the meetings, and largely set the agenda. According to one participant, community mediation’s agenda was drowned in the sea of more powerful centrist interests (Joyce 2004). For example, one rule this broadly representative group adopted was that the Network could not engage in any lobbying or advocacy work, despite the fact that this was central to the work of many community mediation centers in the state.

Similarly, in the 1980s the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts established a statewide committee to monitor the quality of mediation. It was called the Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution. Albie Davis recalls that Rolfe Mayer, a German mediator, observed a number of these meetings and concluded, “Albie, now I see why they call it the Standing Committee. It isn't going anywhere!” Davis further reports that, “Like much of the court system, our time was sucked up into a vacuum with no action” (Davis 2004).

The second step is best represented by the actual participation of movement representatives on policy-making committees, state and local advisory bodies, institutionalized oversight agencies and boards, and in various schemes to design and implement new policies which are at best incrementally responsive to movement concerns. A proscribed number of movement activists are included in limited institutional decision-making and power-sharing. But while substantive power continues to be withheld, “responsibility” for administrative burdens of power is shared as movement leaders channel oppositional activities toward administrative functions (Murphree et.al. 1996. p. 452-453). In developing a uniform mediation law to obviate inter-state conflicts of laws, the National

Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution convened a drafting committee which included but one community mediation director on a committee of twenty individuals (NCCUSL 2001).

Most efforts at social change that enjoy even partial success must include collaboration between the challenging movement and the state and vested interests. Cooptation is a social and political process that has multiple and often contradictory consequences; policy outcomes desired by challengers are sometimes accomplished and benefits may accrue to movements and their organizations through the cooptation process (Kriesberg 2003). If a movement is to achieve gains and solidify them—either incremental gains or more substantive ones—it will require participation in those policy-making bodies set up by the state and vested interests. That is why this step in our model (i.e. inclusion/participation) is one of the more ubiquitous aspects of the social and political cooptation process.

Yet determining whether the inclusion and participation is a positive step forward for the movement's long-range goals is a difficult and delicate task. The movement representative's seat at the table and the voice that comes with it may partially transform the prevailing system and may modify power relations, but not always for very long or very deeply (Amy 1987; Mohavi 1996), and not without other costs to the movement or movement organization (Wondolleck, Manring, and Crowfoot 1990). One cost is the loss of the movement's relative autonomy to create and maintain independent social and political spaces where critiques of status quo norms and policies may be nourished and articulated free from the conceptual constraints and boundaries of established thinking and existing policies (Melucci 1989; Woolford and Ratner 2003). Yet another is the siphoning off of emotional commitment and financial resources from alternative and parallel institutions that originated within the movement and whose establishment and maintenance consume significant amounts of movement energies.

Other negative outcomes this aspect of the cooptation process have been shown to contribute to include movement sell outs (Murphree et al. 1996); the diffusing, disarming and channeling of oppositional forces (Szasz and Meuser 1997); minor

concessions granted to delay major reforms (Coggins 2001); the diffusion of electoral accountability for policy choices (Rochon and Mazmanian 1993); the depoliticization of the issues and a concomitant demobilization of the movement (Mohavi 1996); the entrenchment of class and race disadvantages (Polkinghorn 2000; Varela 2001); and the preservation of state resources and capital accumulation (Hofrichter 1987).

Still other costs to the movement result from what we call the “paradox of collaboration.” When a challenging movement gains entry into policy-making and oversight and implementation bodies, continued participation may become a goal in and of itself. Other movement objectives may be subsumed by the goal of ongoing access in the bodies that are beginning to regulate the partial policy changes that the movement has won. While the challenger movement may in theory abandon its hard-won seat at the table at any moment to return to other forms of contention, examples of this are relatively rare. The paradox of collaboration suggests that most members of the group will increasingly identify with the process due to their participation in it and that their “ownership” of the policy-making process and even of policy implementation will also increase.

The inclusion/participation component of cooptation relies on a principle that is well known in conflict resolution theory and practice: that participation in decision-making and policy-making tends to increase ownership in the policies and decisions, even when the policies do not undergo substantive change and when the specific outcomes are not actually very satisfactory to the included participant (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, p. 77-82, 102-105; Gray 1989, p. 21; Moore 1996, p. 144; Coy 2003; Mansbridge 2003). As members of a challenging movement participate on task forces, working groups, and policy roundtables that partially address some of the movement’s issues, the movement’s foci shift as its organizing energy is transferred from alternative initiatives and redirected toward the maintenance or at best the reform of established processes and institutions (Morrill 1998). This participation, in turn, tends to increase movement ownership in the status quo. Thus it eventually blunts substantive movement challenges and contributes to the salience control aspect of cooptation.

Salience control is closely related to channeling and inclusion/participation and is usually achieved partly as a result of them. Salience control has to do with shifting

the motivational relevance that various issues or grievances have for movement activists. It refers to the "appeasement of group or organizational concerns over critical issues through the appearance that such concerns are being adequately addressed and, as a result, no longer need to be at the forefront of the group's list of outstanding issues" (Murphree et al. 1996. p. 457). One consequence of salience control is that particular concerns eventually wane in priority for the challenging group, even though they have not, in fact, been adequately resolved. Salience control may contribute to erosion in movement mobilization and support for truly alternative initiatives. For example, Goldner's (2001) research on the complimentary and alternative medicine movement in the U.S. shows that as activists in that movement gained entry and worked more closely with institutionalized medicine they changed their collective identity from an alternative movement to an integrative one. Here, as is so often the case with social movements, identity was contingent and movement activists and organizations were politically strategic about their definitions and deployments of collective identities (Coy and Woehrle 1996; Gamson 1996; Bernstein 1997; 2002; Maney, Woehrle and Coy 2005). In the process, however, while they saw specific alternative medicine techniques incorporated into traditional medicine practices, they also lost control of them and sacrificed the holistic ideology that had driven the movement and that under-girded the alternative techniques. As we noted above relative to community mediation, the articulated goals of many pioneering community dispute resolution projects included local empowerment through capacity-building, the redress of social ills and power imbalances, and the democratization of justice (Laue 1982, Wahrhaftig 1982, Davis 1991, Shonholtz 1993). However, these "dreams of justice, dreams of peace" (Beer 1986, p.203) have been scaled down considerably over the past quarter-century within community mediation, only to be replaced by more modest goals and measures (examined in our discussion of Stage Three). Like each of the other steps in this stage model, salience control is best thought of as a process. Thus, we will see below that salience control is also quite relevant in Stage 3b of the model, the assimilation of program goals.

The final step in Stage 2b has to do with the legitimacy that the early stages of institutionalization bring to a challenging movement. As outsiders offering critiques of existing institution and policies, challenging movements need and

desire credibility. This credibility can be intentionally created over time by the movement itself due to its discourse and actions (Coy and Woehrle 1996). It may also accrue to a challenging movement as a result of the institutionalization process; familiarity and inclusion minimally breeds acceptance and may also deliver respect. As mediation became increasingly institutionalized as part of the court system, community mediation centers willing to affiliate with the court system gained new levels of legitimacy, viability and resources.

Many of the community mediation centers set up as alternatives to the courts have tended to be small, not well known in their communities, under-funded, largely reliant on volunteerism, and in need of case referrals (McGillis 1997). Increasing institutionalization with the court system has brought financial resources, more case referrals, a higher profile, and a certain kind of legitimacy (i.e. state-based). None of these developments are problematic in and of themselves. Indeed, many of them have made it possible for some threatened mediation centers to continue to operate and have helped other centers expand the range of services offered to their community (Honeyman 1995). Nonetheless, there are also costs to the individual centers and to the community mediation movement associated with these developments (Beer 1986; Drake and Lewis 1988; Phillips 1997).

With limited support from a disproportionately-poor client base and only short-lived support from local, regional and national philanthropies, many community mediation programs have looked to the courts for funding. Davis's evaluative report on community mediation in Massachusetts found that funding agencies have a profound impact on the shape and approach of individual programs, or in her phrase, "form often follows funding" (1986, p.35). This phenomenon is not limited to community mediation. As women's organization secured government and corporate funding in the 1980s, "radical and alternative organizations became more mainstream as funders insisted on more bureaucratic and hierarchical structures" (Spalter-Roth and Schreiber 1995, p. 119). In a recent study of the robust voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland, Birrell and Williamson argue that the even though the funding scheme there was set up to foster movement independence from the government, the result has still been that funding has "channeled the development of groups in certain directions," including new directions that were not previously valued by the organizations

(2001, p. 211). In a recent study of the influence that funding sources have on Mexican-American social movement organizations, Marquez found that they were greatly influenced by their dependence on external funding sources. This dependence altered the character of the organizations, redirected their programmatic priorities and brought about “far-reaching effect[s] on the contours of minority politics through the initiatives that are funded” (2003, p. 329-341). Similarly, Daniel Cress’ (1997) research on homeless social movement organizations in the U.S. found that those organizations that incorporated as non-profits in order to secure external resources also moderated their goals and their organizing tactics as a result. And as Douglas and Hartley’s (2004) analysis of drug courts found, unstable and unpredictable funding streams have led court administrators to adopt entrepreneurial approaches to finance their programs. The need to satisfy multiple masters with diverse interests has distracted administrators from long-range planning and ultimately risks the goals of the drug court reform movement.

Stage 3a Assimilation of CM leaders, members, participants

In Stage Three of the cooptation process, the state and vested interests assimilate both the individuals and goals of the challenging movement, making it hard for the movement to sustain its efforts. The prior stage involves the state's appropriation of techniques and the participation of challenging movement figures in decision-making. This stage takes both actions to another level, as the state and vested interests develops or sponsors formal reform programs and then attracts movement leaders to staff these new institutional initiatives (Figure D).

As documented earlier in this article, the institutionalization of community mediation began in the earliest days of the challenging movement. In the late 1970s Wahrhaftig (1982) developed a three-part taxonomy of programs based on sponsorship: justice system-sponsored, non-profit agency-sponsored, and community-based. While observing that any of these arrangements could deliver informal dispute resolution, he cautioned that “the political consequences of program sponsorship” (n.p.) require critical examination (see also Hedeem 2003).

Practitioners working within the courts have openly questioned whether such institutionalization is the savior or saboteur of mediation (Press 1997). A recent study of justice system-connected programs in Florida has led to a new typology

of approaches: assimilative, synergistic, and autonomous (Folger et al. 2001). The assimilative approach, which the authors argue has become the dominant one, has three distinguishing traits: “(1) practices that imbue mediation with the authority and formality of the courts, (2) the mapping of legal language onto mediation, and (3) an emphasis on case processing” (Folger et al. 2001, p.103). To the degree that such practices are indeed dominant, they serve to confirm the predictions of skeptical scholars writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s who held that community dispute resolution was little more than a veiled expansion of state control (Abel 1982), and that the formal legal system has “colonized” alternative dispute resolution (Menkel-Meadow 1991).

Within small claims courts (“courts of limited jurisdiction”), juvenile justice offices, and family courts, it is not uncommon for service provision to shift from a referral-out or contract-out basis to an in-house operation, thus replacing and displacing community programs. “Quality assurance” and “program efficiency” are typical justifications, while the result is effectively a return to state control of the mediation resource.

A second distinct step within stage 3a is employment of challenging movement leaders within the SVI structure. Many staff or volunteers of community mediation resources are hired by state agencies, often to coordinate statewide offices for the mediation resources or to direct formal governmental dispute resolution programs. These may include public policy dispute resolution agencies, family mediation offices, and court or juvenile justice mediation programs. While this transfer of staff may have positive gains for both the state agency and the challenging movement—as the state gains an experienced employee and the challenging movement gains a supportive resource person within the state—this also serves to remove seasoned, committed individuals from leadership roles within the challenging movement. The institutional capacity and memory that is lost through such a transaction is a setback for the movement.

The loss of movement leadership is predictable, in part, due to the relatively low wages and limited benefits typically available through non-profit groups such as community mediation. (Fn’Piere 1991, p.31). Even a Department of Justice report amply documented this trend:

[S]taff members tend to be grossly underpaid for the amount, importance, and quality of work they perform. Community mediation personnel deal with many interpersonal and intergroup conflicts that could easily escalate into violence...Their jobs are arguably far more important, by virtually any measure of value to society, than those of employees making four to five times their salaries. Low salaries inevitably lead to higher levels of turnover at programs than would occur if salaries were more commensurate with staff responsibilities. Such turnover can cripple programs while new directors and staff are being recruited and trained. (McGillis 1997, p.87)

Many former staff members of community mediation centers have sought roles in more lucrative and stable positions due to household financial demands. As the directors of a Minnesota center so aptly and simply observed, “People have these jobs [in community mediation] because they can afford to have them.” Thus the loss of movement leadership, especially to the courts—where veteran mediators and dispute resolution administrators might utilize the same skill sets but for greater compensation and stability—is a trend likely to continue.

Stage 3b Transformation of program goals

Through the second step of Stage Three, state institutions play a powerful role in assisting and re-directing the efforts of both state and challenging movement programs (Hartley, Fish, and Beck 2003). Many states have governmental offices that support or coordinate community mediation efforts, including Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. These offices are typically linked to the courts and they often serve as regulating agencies; in many cases, they prescribe policies and guidelines, and monitor mediation operations through reports or site visits. Over time, such state offices frequently serve to transform the traditional goals and values of community mediation. Guidelines for training mediators are often administered by these offices, especially those regarding the required length and content of the training sessions. To qualify for some state funding, community mediation centers must employ only the services of volunteers trained through a state-certified training course. This routinization of training is a form of rationalization, through which both the training service and presumably, the mediation services provided by the individuals trained, will be consistent and predictable.

Rationalization is also evidenced through a shift in program goals: the broader goals of community empowerment, relationship-building, and democratization of justice appear to have been set aside in the name of greater efficiency. Larger caseloads and shorter case processing times are preferred by the courts and other agencies, and a favorable disposition may be rewarded with more cases, more money, or other resources.

In examining both the implementation and the evaluation of neighborhood justice centers, it appears that in this uneasy compromise, the judicial definition of need (the first set of goals), has taken precedence.... Other goals for neighborhood justice centers have been virtually ignored, both in the planning process and in the bulk of evaluation studies. (Merry 1982, p.131)

The emphases on the quantity of cases handled and the celerity with which they are dispatched are complemented by an overriding interest in gaining resolutions. While mediation is often sold to disputants based on its numerous advantages including “its ability to constructively address conflicts, respect each party’s perspective, empower individuals to take personal responsibility for conflicted relations, establish mutually beneficial dialogue, and reduce violence” (Hedeen and Coy 2000), attaining agreements too often becomes the limited measure of success. When programs are designed to deliver agreements (or rewarded for agreements), mediators may pressure disputants in ways that compromise disputant self-determination: “Mediators remind recalcitrant disputants that if they don’t come to agreement, the court may hold it against them” (Beer 1986, p.212).

Efficiency is the established and accepted goal of mediation in many venues. In small claims courts, where community mediation volunteers are often employed, a Department of Justice report listed the five goals of a mediation program: (1) Increasing the efficiency of case processing; (2) Reducing court system costs; (3) Allowing judges to provide added attention to cases on the regular civil docket; (4) Improving the quality of justice; and (5) Improving collection of judgments (DeJong 1983). In Stage 2a above, the issue of time-efficiency was evidenced by twenty-minute mediations (Drake and Lewis 1988), as well as an emphasis on short case turnaround time (McGillis 1997). Research reports on court-based mediation have demonstrated the high proportion of settlements in mediated

cases (Wissler 2002; Woolford and Ratner 2005) and greater durability of agreements (McEwen and Maiman 1984), both measures indicating a low likelihood of these matters returning to court. That these have become widely-accepted indicators of mediation success represents a continuation of the process of salience control (Murphree et al. 1996) addressed above: the valuation of case numbers and outcomes over community capacity building and respectful processes reflects a shift in community mediation.

The state offices mentioned above also often have oversight of the disbursement of state funding, as in Illinois and Virginia. In Illinois, to be eligible for funding pooled from foundations and filing surcharges, community mediation centers must have mediated over 100 cases in each of the prior three years. Further, each center receives a share of the pooled funds based on the number of cases resolved: in each judicial circuit, each center receives an allocation not per services delivered, but per its proportion of the circuit's mediated cases concluding in a written agreement (Illinois General Assembly 710 ILCS 20/5). [\[2\]](#)

The carrot-and-stick enticement of funding based on securing agreements transforms centers to pursue specific goals. This trend was identified early in the community mediation movement: "Centers are restructured in order to generate large caseloads and reduce costs while evaluations stress the number of cases handled and the potential reduction of demands on the criminal and civil justice systems..." (Merry 1982, p.131). And the director of one of the sustaining Neighborhood Justice Centers, looking back over fifteen years, noted

"[O]ne of the elements distinguishing successful centers from those that are struggling has proved to be the strength of referrals from courts. Moreover, the stronger the ties to courts for referrals, the less difficult it is to gain credibility and needed sources of revenue from court budgets as well as other public and private sources..." (Primm 1993, p.1079)

These are manifestations of DiMaggio and Powell's coercive isomorphism, introduced earlier in this article. They also parallel Morrill and McKee's (1993) research findings at a community mediation center in the Southwest, where they documented the organization's survival strategy to be a transformation away from "community improvement" and "personal growth" goals and toward the

processing of court and agency referrals, and the funding, caseload and legitimacy attached to such referrals.

Stage 4a Regulation

One goal of many challenging movements is a desire to achieve administrative rules or to enact laws that will mandate and codify some of the platforms and values of the challenging movement. At their best, such outcomes, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Clean Water Act of 1972 for example, represent a clear, albeit partial success for challenging movements. But in many cases, codification and the regulations that invariably follow are not necessarily a positive outcome for the challenging movement. The Uniform Mediation Act is a case in point.

As mentioned previously, the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in collaboration with the American Bar Association's Section of Dispute Resolution, drafted the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) in 2001 and amended it in 2003. By the autumn of 2004, the UMA had been adopted in two states (Illinois and Nebraska, with modifications) and legislation had been introduced in seven others and the District of Columbia. It is the first nation-wide attempt to regulate aspects of the practice of mediation. As such, the National Association of Community Mediation is strongly and actively opposing the UMA because of its perceived likelihood to erode the independence of community mediation centers, because it weakens the confidentiality and evidentiary privileges that mediators and participants in mediation have with respect to later legal proceedings, and because its universality is perceived to “weaken the opportunity for more appropriate and culturally sensitive forms of justice and adversely affects the creativity and potential growth of mediation” (NAFCM 2003).

The cooptation of a community-based initiative like community mediation is made more likely by widespread pressures to professionalize various social services, including the practice of dispute resolution. McKnight (1995) argues that many initiatives and social services have been professionalized in an effort to create dependence upon experts, and to create the perception among individuals and communities that they are incapable of addressing their own needs. Paralleling Auerbach's view (1983) that both justice and dispute resolution have

been ‘legalized’—that is, appropriated away from individuals and codified into formal law—McKnight’s thesis of professionalization helps explain why many community mediation centers have not been able to generate sustainable case loads of funding levels independent of the court system.

Although the formal regulation of mediation on the state level is not yet widespread, the practice of mediation is increasingly regulated in a variety of ways in some states (Hartley, Fish, and Beck 2003). For example, Virginia established a regulatory agency in 1991, the Department of Dispute Resolution, whose mandate includes establishing and overseeing certification requirements for all court-referred cases in the state. While professional associations have adopted policies to the contrary (even including the American Bar Association), some states now have laws or rules that restrict the practice of court-affiliated mediation to those with law degrees (e.g. Florida). In addition, some states require a bachelor’s degree for mediators affiliated with district and circuit courts (e.g. Virginia), and some states now require the same for local courts. Melinda Smith, former co-chair of NAFCM, metaphorically refers to this regulatory practice as “pulling up the ladder.” A trend may be emerging: higher educational thresholds and more restrictive mediator certifications. Yet community mediation has always relied upon mediators who are drawn from the general community and are often volunteers. Most community mediation centers are committed to building pools of trained mediators that are reflective of the community’s diversity, and many are increasingly meeting this commitment. State regulations that require advanced degrees or law degrees are in direct opposition to this principle (Pipkin and Rifkin 1984).

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act was originally signed into federal law in 1975 to ensure that children with disabilities had access to education and educational services. It was substantially amended in 1997 to include the governing of special education mediation practice. The Act now mandates that only solo mediation may be practiced with disputants who are protected by the Act. Such a restriction is contrary to the practice of community mediation which has increasingly tended toward 1) the use of co-mediators in order to be responsive to gender, ethnic, age, and power differences between disputants; 2) using either solo mediators or co-mediators according to whichever is deemed more culturally appropriate for the particular mediation.

The increasing codification and regulation of mediation houses a peculiar irony. After all, one of the originating goals of community mediation was to set citizens free from some of the limitations of law and from the rigidities of formal legal institutions with regard to how they manage their conflicts (Menkel-Meadow 1991). Yet this irony runs much deeper than it first appears to. For as mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution have become more commonplace in some court systems, lawyers still operating out of an adversarial model employ mediation and other ADR mechanisms “not for the accomplishment of a ‘better’ result, but as another weapon in the adversarial arsenal to manipulate time, methods of discovery, and rules of procedure for perceived client advantage” (Menkel-Meadow 1991, p. 1). This has contributed, in turn, to many issues associated with the practice of court-affiliated mediation being litigated, meaning that case and statutory law about mediation is now being developed, including a jurisprudence about mediation and ADR. The practice of mediation and the ways and manners of which individual citizens may avail themselves of it are increasingly proscribed.

4b Protective Responses

“... I love the idea that the judicial system and other institutions are trying to coopt and justify ADR. It shows that we've evolved to the point we can't be ignored. You start something great and people come. It's like a fantastic unknown vacation or fishing spot. It's hard not to tell people about it and ... once you do ... it's not yours alone anymore and somebody will use it in ways that you don't like and/or try to screw it up.” --Ben Carroll, July 31, 2002 posting to NAFCM Network

When the cooptation of a challenging movement engages the stage of codification and regulation, the movement and some of its organizations may adopt reactive strategies and defensive measures to protect the integrity of the movement’s alternative institutions, practices and cultures. The Ohio Community Mediation Association (OCMA), for example, was formed in May 2002. It consists of fifteen community mediation centers throughout Ohio and its mandate is to represent the interests of community mediation centers in the policy-making process in Ohio. Among the OCMA’s core beliefs and values are ones that are deeply reflective of the values that originally spawned the community mediation movement, that is, to be agents of change by intentionally addressing social

justice issues in their work, responding to the needs of the entire community, advocating for collaborative, inclusive and fair processes in the community, ensuring open access to conflict resolution services, and adhering to self-determination such that the community determines and defines what quality mediation is for their community. ^[3] When the Uniform Mediation Act was introduced into the Ohio House of Representatives in 2003, the OCMA spearheaded opposition to the Act through a partially successful statewide lobbying campaign that has delayed the progress of the legislation and which continues to try to win modifications in the legislation (Joyce 2004).

Concluding Analysis

In their useful analysis of the institutionalizing of restorative justice in British Columbia, Woolford and Ratner effectively argue that cooptation and colonization in that context is not a “necessary outcome” (2003, p. 189). We are of the same mind with regard to social movements and cooptive processes in general, and the community mediation movement in the U.S. in particular. The social dynamics of cooptation are not made up of some inexorable force progressing toward a pre-ordained and complete coopting of challenging movements. Such a view does a disservice to the nature and power of social movement challenges to the status quo, driven as they often are by shared identities and deeply-held values and visions that movement activists are often convinced will bring about a better, more just and humane world (Melucci 1989). Thus, even in the face of substantial degrees of overall movement cooptation, there will long remain practical exemplars of the values and ideals that originally drove a challenging movement. That is certainly the case for the community mediation movement.

Many of the members of the National Association for Community Mediation, for example, continue to tend assiduously to the fire that originally animated the movement even while also going out to gather new recruits committed to a particular vision of community mediation. This vision honors party self-determination, local control over the practice of mediation, broad community access to services, a reliance on community volunteers, and a commitment to working on the deeper causes of social conflicts. Of the many members of the National Association for Community Mediation that we could point to in this regard, we mention two here. The Cleveland Mediation Center, which has

maintained a strong and independent community component coupled with a deep commitment to advocacy on the social justice issues that contribute to conflicts in the community, remains an independent and robust force for constructive conflict resolution within the city of Cleveland twenty-five years after its founding. Certainly centers which are founded in communities that traditionally enjoy high degrees of citizen activism and which tend to support community-based initiatives as alternatives to centralized systems will be more likely to protect themselves from the deleterious effects of cooptation. Being recurrently intentional about a program's purposes, mandate, and identity also seems to matter. For example, the CDRC (Community Dispute Resolution Center) that was started in Ithaca, NY in 1983, remains quite community-based and attentive to the cooptive pressures it faces. The Ithaca center continues to be committed to its origins, including that it started "with the idea that people should have an informal, quick and inexpensive way for dealing with conflicts. Mediation provides that opportunity. CDRC chose to be community-based, recruiting and training community volunteers as its mediators" (<http://www.cdrc.org/>). ^[4]

In all cases, there are degrees of accommodation and cooptation. Many mediation centers engage in creative relationships with the formalized legal system, using the revenues generated from court-referred mediation cases to provide free access to dispute resolution services and conflict management skills training to schools and community groups. Research on a broad range of peace and environmental groups demonstrates that challenging movements that eschew partnerships and working relationships with the state and with the systems and structures that they are trying to change do not fare well over the long term (Zisk 1992). Similarly, Woolford and Ratner persuasively argue that the restorative justice movement in British Columbia must be a nomad, occupying an "oscillating space," one not located entirely within or outside the legal system and where strategic interventions in the legal system are combined with the maintenance of relative degrees of independence from the system's hegemonic forces (2003, p. 188).

As we have amply demonstrated above, occupying and maintaining an oscillating space vis a vis the formal legal system is no small feat for the community mediation movement as a whole, or for specific centers. Those working in the

field of community mediation face a plethora of pressures, including funding, volunteer recruitment and retention, training, community support, and maintaining independence. While some of these pressures can be creatively reconfigured in a complementary fashion, many more are contradictory. In either event, particular decisions or actions are too often considered out of context, such that the larger ramifications and long-term meanings are not readily apparent.

Precisely how, then, might community mediation centers maintain this oscillating space? What ought they to do? While we do not pretend to know the answers, we are quite sure that for movement activists to have as full of an understanding of the processes of cooptation as possible is an important part of the answer. The is is usually parent to the *ought*. Put another way, an accurate description of a social problem is a prerequisite to an adequate prescription (Maguire 1979).

In considering opportunities for collaboration with the state or vested interests, movement actors would do well to mark the words of Dave Brubaker, a veteran mediator, “in relationships marked by power imbalances, cooperation and cooptation are nearly indistinguishable” (2003). That these processes appear so similar highlights the need for close analysis of partnerships and collaborative pilot projects like the one described at this article’s outset.

Our general study of social movements and our more detailed examination of the community mediation movement led us to develop this stage model of cooptation. We have shown how and why a stage model of cooptation is reflective of key aspects of the community mediation experience in the United States. Other scholars studying similar processes in other movements may find that this stage model of cooptation is analytically useful in other contexts. Goldner (2001) has shown, for example, that the complementary and alternative medicine movement has undergone very similar pressures as those described here as it gradually gained acceptance within the traditional medical establishment.

Mary Parker Follett (1924), who understood both the promise and the paradox of collaboration long before many others, wrote that “a fact out of relation is not a fact at all.” By dissecting the process of cooptation to its constitutive parts through a stage model with many discrete steps in each stage, movement

activists may be better able to recognize the process as it evolves over time and to understand the significance of specific events and individual actions and decisions. To the degree that those movement activists can understand how particular actions relate to the larger whole, they are better able to make decisions that are more informed and more likely to honor their professed goals and values.

Suggested Reading:

[Stratfor Monitors and Studies Social Movements](#), by Kevin Zeese, 2013.

[Here's How Corporations Defeat Political Movements](#) by Steve Horn, 2013.

[A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation](#) by Patrick G. Coy and Tim Hedeon, 2007.

[The Sanders Campaign and the Left](#) by Ashley Smith and Lance Selfa, 2016.

The Democrats: A Critical History by Lance Selfa, Haymarket Books, 2012.

7. Infiltration

We describe the difference between an infiltrator and an informant. We explain the broad goals of infiltrators to gather information and disrupt and provide a list of tactics that are used. We explain how to recognize that an infiltrator may be present and what to do about it to both protect the organization and to confront the infiltrator.

Slides:

Goals of lecture	Infiltration
<p>After this lecture, you will be able to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Explain the difference between infiltrators and informants• Know how to identify possible infiltration.• Understand how to prevent or mitigate infiltration <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>Definitions:</p> <p>Infiltrators – individuals who insert themselves for the purposes of gathering intelligence or dividing, disrupting or misdirecting the group. Can be an amateur or a professional paid by law enforcement or a corporation. They usually have no prior connection to the group or true concern for the issues. They are motivated by ideological opposition, employment or money.</p> <p>Informers – members of the group who have been “turned” or induced to betray the group, whether to avoid criminal charges or for money. Some are simply people with addictions (alcohol, drugs, gambling debts) who are manipulated into talking. They are used to provide evidence against (former) colleagues, or to entrap them.</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>

Cautionary Advice

- Avoid denial or refusing to believe potential infiltration
- Avoid getting angry and taking pre-emptive action
- Unfounded paranoia is not helpful to anyone but your opponent
- Accusations need to be grounded in facts

It is rare that there is clear proof you have an insider working against you. Ask: could the events that have aroused your suspicions be based on intelligence gathered through phone taps, bugs, electronic surveillance and so on? Eliminate alternatives before accusing



Group Discipline

- Always have proof before you make accusations. It is easy to convince yourself that a person is guilty because that is the basic premise you are working on. Be open to that you might have it wrong
- Witch-hunts based on insufficient evidence and vague rumors can destroy groups
- Do not even make joking accusations or spread gossip as rumors will be damaging
- People who constantly make such accusations need to be confronted
- Never go public on insufficient evidence - creates bad atmosphere, undermines credibility, creates someone who could become an informant



Indicators of Infiltration

- Things start going wrong
- Opponents seem to know what you are planning despite your precautions
- Constant internal disruption
- New faces at meetings acting dubiously
- Your opponents have a history of targeting groups
- Allied groups warn you of individuals that were problems for them



Infiltrator Tactics: Gathering Information

- Seek information on protests or plans to preempt, disrupt or do advance media to undermine
- Build profiles on participants for use to cause division, target legal actions, create informers
- Find weaknesses on participants or in the group they can use
- Create long-term relationships for ongoing information
- Share information with other enforcement groups or corporations



Infiltrator Tactics: Causing Internal Dissent

Division:

Make accusations or share false written statements, then spread rumor the accusations or letter is fake, causing back-and-forth finger accusations that are not provable

Disinformation:

Police (or other infiltrating body) falsely inform someone in group that there is an infiltrator to create paranoia and disruption.



Specific Infiltrator Actions

- Volunteer for tasks that gather information, i.e. planning, financial, membership lists, recycling paperwork
- Ask probing questions that seem intrusive, about areas where they are not involved
- Overgenerous with money, e.g. buying drinks or drugs to gain confidence get people talking
- Have money without a job
- Are insistent on giving people rides home, especially going out of their way
- Regularly come to meetings but don't attend protests or other events
- Don't follow through on important tasks, even though capable of doing so



Specific Infiltrator Actions

- Commit group to expensive or divisive activities
- Are in the middle of personal disputes
- Make public statements inconsistent with the groups messages
- Get involved in or take over media or social media pages
- Urge violence or breaking of serious laws
- Make false claims or exaggerating their role in other movements
- Leave for several days at a time
- Avoid answering questions about their personal lives
- Seeming immunity from arrest or prosecution



Social Media and Infiltration

Social media makes it easy for infiltrators to join groups, to find information about people and groups and to cause disruption.

Problem:

- It is hard to verify people online.
- A person may use a false identity.
- Trolls - a real person whose goal is to antagonize or purposely spread misinformation.



Social Media Strategies

- Watch for fake pictures - do a search for source of photos
- Watch for recent account creation date
- Look for the number of followers – a small number or large numbers of followers in a short time
- Have different levels of security for FB and DM groups on Twitter, open groups and closed groups that are vetted
- A lot of information can be gathered on groups by searching FB and Twitter feeds, no need for infiltration as much is open. Be careful what you make public.
- Check someone's history on social media, e.g. www.AllMyTweets.net



Preventing Infiltration

Interview:

Welcome new people, get to know them, ask about their interests, why they are getting involved, how they heard about the group, if they know anyone in group, how aware they are about details of the cause.

Discreetly inquire about their background and personal life and check it out. Where did they go to high school, college, work? Cover stories are a mix of truth and fiction. Hard to lie all the time when being probed.

Do a video interview, e.g. why are you an activist, what brought you to get involved, how did you learn of this campaign



Preventing Infiltration

Observe:

Note with whom they come to movement, how they arrived e.g. is car visible?

Verify:

Visit the home, meet the family of new people

Check with who they claim to know, watch if they pretend to be part of a group, i.e. hide in a group they are not part of

Check with other groups to see if they have had experience with the person



Preventing Infiltration

Protect:

- Provide new people with training, skill them up, partner with a trusted member
- Do not expose new people to sensitive material
- Put processes in place to protect information
- Use security culture to limit who has information to key details and plans
- Get experienced legal advice
- Make public information or FOIA requests
- During actions, have trusted people with new people to prevent provocateur actions



Preventing Infiltration

Document:

Create a file to of suspicions events, statements to people, agent provocateur actions, look for patterns and inconsistencies, record dates, times and places.

KEEP THIS INFORMATION IN A SAFE PLACE, STORED SECURELY

Set a trap, e.g. arrange an event and see if more police are in the area



Exposing A Suspected Infiltrator

•At this stage, the evidence should be sufficient that their game is essentially up – though they may not actually accept that and will deny and get angry. Get a photo of the person in case they leave group

•Arrange a small group meeting between a few of you with the suspect and put your evidence before them.

•Bring information to the full group, watch for suspect's story changes from first meeting, may be good to have an outside facilitator, have suspect leave room and have group develop a consensus, if group agrees ask infiltrator to leave the group

•If person leaves group claiming innocence there could be fall out, be transparent about the evidence and why it was gathered, explain why not everyone was involved in investigation, e.g. did not want to make accusations or start rumors



Exposing A Suspected Infiltrator

- If you have conclusive proof; Consider going to the media with the information, sharing photographs and information with other groups, publishing information on website
- Correct mistakes that let this happen, create new processes, change locks, passwords etc.
- Consider holding a public meeting to discuss spying in your community and around the country. Schedule a speaker or film discussing political surveillance.



Broad Infiltration Prevention Strategy

- Campaign for infiltration and surveillance to be outlawed at a national level
- Make infiltration redundant - organize on as open, deep, and broad a basis as possible.
- A mass movement of tens of thousands, while more easily infiltrated, will be able to generate enough momentum to shift the political landscape despite infiltration.



Selections from Infiltrators, Informers and Grasses: How, Why and What to do If Your Group is Targeted, by the Accidental Anarchist

Some cautionary words

It really is an unpleasant task having to deal with informants, and often reactions get very emotional. Some people go into denial, refusing to believe it; others get very angry and want to take pre-emptive action. These are both natural reactions, but neither are helpful. If you get the presentation wrong you can end up breaking a group or cause a witch-hunt of an innocent individual. Unfounded paranoia is not helpful to anyone but your enemies. Indeed, paranoia is not part of the security process; it is an unhelpful state of mind often built on emotion. Your fears need to be grounded in facts and rational consideration to be part of your security in a useful way. You need to be able to back them up with more than vague hypotheticals that can justify any position you are taking.

Fortunately, the problem of insiders working against us is not as big as we might suppose, and those who sponsor them spread disinformation about the extent of it. It suits their purpose to keep people guessing. It is always good to remember there has been and remains a long history of successful campaigns and actions despite the informers operating inside our groups. It does not matter if your group is very open rather than closed and covert. There is still much that a skilled operative can do to cause disruption to make you ineffective. For example, planting false information such as at the Heathrow Camp for Climate Action's plenary, or journalists deliberately twisting your unguarded words. Just because you have nothing to hide does not mean that you are going to be able to avoid the issue, it just means you have different methods to deal with dishonest intentions.

If there is one thing to take away from this is to always have proof before you start making accusations against someone. Witch-hunts based on insufficient evidence and vague rumours have ended up destroying groups. Calling someone a snitch is a very serious charge to lay at anyone's door. The personal consequences can be a backlash against yourself, or even causing your group to split. It is never to be done lightly; do not mention it jokingly in conversation behind someone's back as that is how nasty rumours begin. Even passing on accusations made by others without real factual backup or research is to be avoided.

Individuals who constantly make up this sort of accusation about those who disagree with them, or even on personal grounds, need to be challenged as this acts as to poison the group as a whole. This has been a deliberate tactic developed by state agents (acting both overtly and covertly) to disrupt enemies or dissident groups.

A classic example, dated now, was to forge a letter from one member of a group making allegations against another to cause internal dissent, and then spread rumours that the letter is a fake. Impossible to get to the bottom of, the result is a group that implodes trying to find out the actual truth, dividing along personal and political allegiances. Fortunately, this has become fairly obsolete, but it is an illustration of the levels that the State is willing to go to. Read Machiavelli.

Disinformation from the police is also a factor to concern yourselves with. They are aware that a group closing in on itself, drawing away in paranoia and mistrust is effectively dead. So they will let it “slip” that some of their success has come from an inside source in order to create the divisions that allows them to break your group and individuals down.

Often it is guesswork or intelligence gathered from other sources such as listening devices and tapped telephones, carefully shaped to make it look like they know more than they do. Take care and tread carefully before making allegations, do not do their work for them. If in doubt, find independent people who have had experience dealing with informers and infiltrators and get advice from them before leaping to conclusions.

Information gathering

a) Volunteering for tasks which give access to important meetings and papers such as financial records, membership lists, minutes and confidential files, including typing up notes and ‘recycling’ the paperwork. Often they quite dull tasks so people are happy to pass them on to others despite how much they expose details of the group’s members.

b) Asking probing questions bordering on the intrusive, particularly about people’s personal details and actions questioner was not involved in. This allows them to build up a picture of people’s roles in the group.

- c) Regularly being overgenerous with money, including financing stuff or buying people drinks and/or drugs to gain access to activists socially with the aim of gaining their confidence or just causing them to become talkative.
- d) Being insistent on giving people lifts home, especially when it means they are going out of their own way.
- e) Regularly praising key people to their faces.
- f) Regularly coming to meetings, joining discussions in the pub, but never getting involved in the group as such.

Disruption & discrediting

- g) Not following through on, or completing, important tasks; or doing them poorly despite an obvious ability to do good work.
- h) Causing problems for a group such as committing it to activities or expenses without following proper channels; or encouraging the group to plan activities that divide group unity.
- i) Seeming to be in the middle of personal or political differences that are disruptive to the group.
- j) Seeking the public spotlight, and then making comments or presenting an image different from the rest of the group.
- k) Urge the use of violence or breaking the law, and provide information and resources to enable such ventures, but never quite get involved in the actions they have facilitated setting up. This depends closely on the nature & atmosphere of your group. Context is important here, especially how heavily monitored the group is.
- l) Charge other people with being agents, (a process called *snitch-jacketing*), thereby diverting attention from him or herself, and draining the group's energy from other work.
- m) Recommending or bringing around people of dubious character.
- n) Where they have control over important information, they are obstructive in letting others sharing it in to the point important tasks are not able to be done.

o) Offering to supply key equipment which they do not follow through with, or else is of consistently poor quality.

Inconsistency

p) Having no obvious source of income over a period of time, or having more money available than their job should pay; eg. an expensive car.

q) Inconsistent about their background – lies at this level are hard to maintain completely, and slip-ups do occur; take note of inconsistencies and follow up any ‘facts’ they tell you.

r) Making false claims and exaggerating their roles in other movements.

s) Going out of their way to avoid answering questions about their home, family life, jobs.

t) Often disappearing for several days at a time – regularly happens with local police infiltrating as they have other work to do.

u) Have partners who suddenly disappear out of their lives as if they barely existed, to be replaced by someone in the group.

v) Live in houses that do not have feeling of being “lived in” – sparse details about themselves, lacking in photos, etc.

w) Seeming immunity from prosecution.

x) If the infiltrator is from the media they will often deliberately put forward mad ideas in order to create a more exciting response or story, in order to set up opportunities for their stories.

Remember, none of the above is by itself proof someone is an infiltrator. It may be that information is leaking through carelessness or surveillance on you. That someone is disruptive by nature, power hungry, or a pathological liar does not mean they are an informer, but they do need to be dealt with appropriately. There are also those people who are genuine control freaks and will disrupt if they cannot get their way within a group, and end up destroying it out of petulance rather than deliberate mischief. We do not cover it here, but it is a security issue in some ways as it causes others to become disaffected, feel

betrayed, etc. The main thing is not to let it continue unchallenged to the point it affects your group's work.

Another source of information for State and companies are those who are security risk in themselves. That is, they do not have a personal sense of other people's security or refuse to acknowledge it as an issue. Alternatively, they may not be able to help themselves from boasting to increase their stature or get very talkative when drinking with strangers for what ever reason. They may not actually realise they are a liability. Likewise, people aware of an action but not directly involved in it, rarely share the same sense of security in relation to it as those involved as they are not directly at risk. They can inadvertently jeopardise actions or activists as a result.

These people are not informers in the common sense, but the effect is the same. How the group deals with this will vary, but sometimes it will require a degree of harshness as there are more important things at stake. If it becomes known other groups will stop working with yours, or the group may split over the matter. This is a possibility where some members want to end their association with the individual, while others wish to continue working with them, whether because of personal history or political reasons. The best approach is transparency – discuss it out together rather than in small cliques.

Initial Action & Gathering Evidence

Once you are sure your suspicions have substance, check with a couple of others whom you trust to check you are not alone. If several of you feel the same way, all independently then that is a good sign there is something afoot. With them onboard, the next stage is to gather evidence to back up your suspicions.

1. Contact someone experienced for advice (legal and practical), or a professional group such as Buro Jansen & Jansen (www.burojansen.nl).
2. Put processes in place to protect sensitive material or planned actions; often if you close off the information supply your suspects have been accessing they may soon drop out anyway, solving one problem.
3. Create a file of question marks over the suspect(s), noting all the evidence you are gathering. This should include accounts of suspicious events and statements from people. It is worth doing this even if you have not identified particular

suspects as it helps identify patterns. Record dates, time, places, people present and other material that puts the event into context. Note disruption of actions, eg. the unexpected presence of police **Keep this safely stored, preferably encrypted or using codes – think of the danger of it falling into the wrong hands!**

4. Discreetly inquire about their background and personal life and check it out. This is probably the most important part of the investigation, and subtlety is paramount here to avoid tipping them off. Never discuss it openly on phones, email, etc, in case they are being monitored as well. It is very hard for infiltrators to lie consistently all the time, especially if you are probing in areas where they do not have a cover prepared. Remember, cover stories tend to be a mix of both truth and lies. Make notes of any inconsistencies, but allow for the fact that people often exaggerate anyway just to fit in. If several people are doing this (though not all at once!) then a better picture develops.

5. If they claim to be, or to have been involved in other groups, speak to them, maybe taking a photo in case the suspect has changed their name. Often when an infiltrator has been exposed in one group, they simply move onto other ones in related movements, using their experience and contacts to make the transition easier. However, watch out for other groups tipping off your suspect, so be careful if you are approaching third parties for help and ask them to stay silent.

6. Check out their claims by contacting their 'employer', or following them home. Something is probably amiss is when a person drives an old car to meetings, but can be found driving something much newer at home, or the place of employment cannot be found. If they are being secretive make excuses to visit their home, or arrange surveillance of them. More sophisticated operations will have these basics covered though. In some situations it is useful to distract the person and go through their possessions, including phones and computers, to see if there is anything incriminating – particularly useful at gatherings or meetings where there is limited time to evaluate someone. If you have access to where they live then check out their bins, diaries and personal spaces such as bedrooms, which often have giveaway clues (eg. a "vegan" with meat wrappers in the bin).

7. It is always useful to visit their relatives where possible. Infiltrators often try to keep family away from the group they are targeting, and in some cases it has been family who have let slip useful clues.

8. As you progress in confirming your suspicions approach others you implicitly trust to help build your body of evidence. We really emphasis caution here, as it is hard to prevent people's suspicions from leaking into meetings and social events. However, if several people already suspect a person independently then that is a good sign you are on the right track – as long as it is not just on the grounds that the suspect is simply new and particularly keen or does not have great social skills. Beware also that jealousy might sometimes be a factor.

9. Be aware of people simply jumping on the bandwagon and agreeing with you uncritically. Constructive challenges to your assumptions are worth having; but at this stage it should be on a need to know basis.

10. Set a trap. "Arrange" an action or meeting that the suspect is informed of and check to see if there are any police or extra security waiting. If the subject is talking about their involvement with others in the group this may be tricky to organise. It needs to be planned carefully, and may need to be done more than once to catch the person out, especially if they are in for the long term as they will wish to avoid raising suspicion before they have had a chance to properly integrate with the group. Also one set of unexplained extra presence can be explained away as bad luck; more than once ceases to be coincidence, though it may be bad security practice on the behalf of the suspect such as talking openly over the phone about it – in which case you have a liability anyway. Avoid acting too out of character so as not to tip them off that it is a trap, or doing it in a way which may arouse suspicions from others in your group that there may be something worth investigating. Often in such a set up the suspect, if they are working for the State, etc., will back out rather than do something incriminating. Either way you know they are not up for it and not to be given trust lightly.

11. If you suspect you have an agent provocateur, consider getting them to incriminate themselves – have a dictaphone ready so when the opportunity arises you have evidence, in case anything is used against you in the future, that it was the infiltrator or the grass who tried to entrap you. Keep the recordings secure (not in your house) and make backup copies. Maybe talk to a lawyer you can trust. Most police infiltrators will try to avoid being active in anything that may be construed as illegal as this will compromise their evidence in court – especially if it can be argued they instigated it or had a chance to prevent it. Private

investigators will be less inhibited. This is an extreme action and we really cannot recommend that you carry a dictaphone around as it puts other, genuine, activists at risk. Never do it for genuine actions you are involved in. Plus if people notice you might be the one who ends up getting suspected. *Only do this if you have a very strong belief that someone is attempting to set you up.*

When investigating someone it is easy to convince yourself that they are guilty because that is the basic premise you are working on. Be open to being challenged that you might have got it wrong or that what you have assembled simply is not sufficient. So the last part of this stage is to bring in an outsider who can evaluate the evidence from an experienced and independent viewpoint without the same emotional attachment you have, and who has credibility with others.

You want your case to be as water-tight as possible, but saying that, it is often very hard to get that sort of evidence. Sometimes you can only ever be, say, 80% certain that you have the right person, in which case it is even more important to get an external review before going public. Never go public on insufficient evidence – what happens if you get it wrong! You could lose a person who could subsequently be turned against you, and you can end up creating a bad atmosphere in your group, disrupting your effectiveness. You also will lose credibility and may even have people turn on you. If you got it wrong, even before you go public, be prepared to admit it, especially if you have spoken to others. Make a point of going back to them and stress that the suspicions should remain confidential. Otherwise these things have a habit of getting out through careless talk, which does nobody any good.

Exposing the infiltrator

Meeting with the suspect

When you have gathered what you feel is sufficient evidence, the next question is the appropriate manner to act upon it. How this is done depends on the horizontal/vertical nature of your group. For hierarchical groups, speak to key people you feel can be trusted with the information and ask them how to proceed.

For non-hierarchical, grassroots groups, which we are focusing on, the best approach is to get the information out to the group as a whole, which you need to plan for. The first part is to arrange a meeting between a few of you with the suspect and put your evidence before them. Ideally bring in an outsider who had no knowledge of the suspect to act as facilitator and/or to make independent judgement.

Watch the suspect's reactions and carefully note their explanations of the evidence. Be ready to listen and present calmly; it is not the time to go in all guns blazing and making accusations before the evidence is present. You need to keep in mind that they might actually be innocent, and that this process is going to be very insulting and upsetting for them. Avoid your own hubris.

However, normally, by this stage the evidence should be sufficient that their game is essentially up – though they may not actually accept that, which can result in arguments and them shouting that it's all a hoax, that they cannot work under these conditions, and so on. If you are going to publicly expose them afterwards get a photograph of your infiltrator while you still can. Either way you need to be ready for their anger and for them to throw accusations back at you.

Going to your group

Next, arrange a full meeting of your group, and put the case before them. It is wise not to announce the true purpose of the meeting beforehand as others talking to your suspect may inadvertently tip them off. When talking about the meeting in advance do so only in the most oblique terms (eg. a "significant security issue has come up").

Ideally the meeting challenging the suspect will take place shortly before the meeting with the group as a whole. If they do come to the meeting to defend themselves, they will be better prepared and change their story to adapt to the evidence, so you will have to challenge them on this – this is the main reason for having witnesses at the initial confrontation, and they should come to the group meeting as well. As with the initial meeting with the suspect it is important where possible to have outside facilitators and a clear sense of process. At the end of the meeting, ask the suspect to leave the room so the rest of the group can come to a consensus on which side they believe. It may be worth you leaving as well to

avoid claims of bias. If they agree with you, then ask the infiltrator to leave the group.

If there is no group meeting

There are two situations here. One is where the infiltrator has left still asserting their innocence. The other is that given geography, security etc, there are good reasons why it is not possible to call the group together physically. In both cases there are very good reasons for you to take immediate action. The infiltrator may attempt to get in first and poison the group against you, turning the tables so that it is you who ends up justifying your behaviour, not them. They may also make it a personal thing that affects the group dynamics. The other issue is that the sooner you begin dealing with the fall out the healthier it is all round.

The two key things at this point are:

- (1) Primarily, providing straight away to your group the information to back your claims up. It is important that things are clear and transparent to ensure that you are not seen as abusing power.
- (2) Also, you will undoubtedly have to explain to some group members why they have not been trusted with this information to date, as they may be hurt by the perceived lack of confidence in them.

Inconclusive evidence

If you cannot find strong proof for your suspicions, you need to approach the matter differently. A potential approach is to confront the person with your suspicions as it may be enough for them to back off, but be prepared for the situation to backfire and they deny everything (after all they may be innocent). Perhaps do it partially, to get them to confirm or deny a part of their story, doing it gradually rather than confrontationally so you can back off without raising too much suspicion if there is a material change or they have provided satisfactory explanations. Continue to monitor them if necessary.

Dealing with the fallout

Once the infiltrator has been exposed you need to protect your reputation and to repair the damage to your group:

(1) Consider going to the press to highlight the issue. The appropriateness of this depends on the nature of your group and is often better suited for more mainstream groups with a policy of staying within the law.

(2) Let other groups know through established channels. Publish a photograph of the person on relevant websites and other news services (magazines, Indymedia, etc.) so others are also able to identify the infiltrators. Exposing “burning”) an infiltrator like this can put them out of the job for good. Always substantiate your accusations. Send a letter to the groups you are connected with giving an explanation and what you are planning to do to minimize the problem. An example of how one infiltrator was exposed and advertised is the first “Notes from the

Borderland” by Larry O’Hara, which deals with the activities of the infiltrator Tim Hepple/Matthews.

(3) Expect some uninformed backlash and loss of reputation, but it is better this happens than people finding out through rumour which will affect your credibility even more. The real danger you face here is rumours spreading unchecked and nobody being able to verify claims and counterclaims.

(4) Put in processes to prevent it happening again. This will help protect your reputation following any backlash over the exposure of the infiltrator. It is more important to be seen to acknowledge mistakes and being pro-active about rectifying them than trying to keep it secret. You can come away stronger as a group if it causes you to adopt better and more sustainable security practices.

(5) Change locks, passwords, protocols, etc. and analyse the effect on materials and campaigns they may have been involved with.

(6) There may be further questions relating to other individuals that the infiltrator has brought into the group, and time may need to be put aside to deal with this.

(7) Act to minimise the damage to your group. This is important to stop unnecessary paranoia and infighting that can arise – especially where some members do not fully believe the gathered evidence or where there have been relationships between the infiltrator and group members.

Some group members may not want to accept that they have been conned in this fashion and their objections may be based on this. Others may be deeply traumatised so you need as a group to come together for them. As important as anything else is to look after yourselves. It is horrible when it happens, so look after each other and deal with the emotional side of things so that you can come out stronger. Do not try and bury it away and pretend it did not happen. At least have a meeting to talk about it openly.

New people

Many people when they first get involved are often excited by what they have read and heard. They may not have had a chance to adjust to our security culture and needs. It does not make them spies, and jumping down their throats immediately – or not explaining the situation to them because you’ve gone into paranoid mode – does nobody any good. You are more likely to lose enthusiastic people.

What may seem obvious to us is only so because of our experience as activists; it may not be that way to an outsider so allow them that initial space. Explain to them first! We were all young, naïve and eager to take action once, so think back to what it was like then, and the mistakes that you made.

The main thing is to avoid letting paranoia take over. People do not join a group fully clued-up, so don’t expect them to be. A group with so much paranoia that it is actually impossible to join is not going to go far. This sort of paranoia also prevents accurate instincts from developing. Saying that if they truly believed new people would put up with the paranoia and exclusion is a poor excuse and symptomatic of a group which is not dealing with security on a rational level.

If your group is genuinely concerned about new people coming into it, for whatever reason, then develop a process bringing them in, testing them and skilling them up. You can be cautious and welcoming at the same time. Wait until you get to know them before actually making pre-emptive judgements. If they still do not get it, then is the time to become somewhat more concerned. If your campaign is structured securely, a grass or infiltrator should only be able to achieve limited damage, plus you should not be exposing new people to sensitive material anyway. It is always good to visit people at their homes or just learn

about their backgrounds. Maybe even meet their parents if such an opportunity arises. This helps build up trust.

How to Spot an Infiltrator in Your Movement

There has been a lot of talk about agent provocateurs and infiltrators into movements such as Fees Must Fall and other Leftist groups. This should not surprise us. It is clear that no movement would be devoid of plentiful infiltrators in this day and age and that some of them would be conspicuous on the picket line and found in organisational capacities within the struggle.

Throughout modern history radical movements such as the Black Panthers, Anti-Apartheid and Occupy have been plagued by infiltrators and agent provocateurs. But nowadays, when the matter of infiltrators or moles is suggested in the South African context there is a tendency to push it aside as exaggeration or paranoia and thus agents are given the space to carry on with their business without scrutiny. However the global problem of state funded agents is as rife now as it ever was, perhaps even more so, as neoliberal governments are intent on smashing any uprising, individual or organisation that threatens their share-based partnership with monopoly capital.

Based on observations and research, we have put together a lengthy composite of what traits and methods a modern day infiltrator would manifest. Of course, some of these traits may be those of an over enthusiastic member – but a combination of these traits should not be ignored.

This guideline list is not intended to create paranoia or sow divisions among activists, but to create an awareness around behavioral traits of people who are there to report back to business or government on the plans and activities of your movement or organisation.

1. A bogus activist or agent appears out of nowhere but becomes a best friend very quickly, ensconcing themselves into the targeted movement seamlessly.
2. They are quick learners and start to speak the language of the movement in a short space of time.

3. Their hairstyle and clothing quickly changes to adapt to the going trends.
4. Not long after they arrive on the scene something calamitous happens which injures the solidarity between members irrevocably.
5. This bogus activist is usually at the center of organising actions around the calamity.
6. It is through this that this person's role is created and endorsed in the movement.
7. They have come with a mandate so they gravitate to and befriend people whom they can use to fulfill this mandate.
8. They look for the most vulnerable in this group and reach out to them, helping them with their material needs such as shelter, food a shoulder to cry on and lifts to direct action.
9. They use flattery, bolstering certain people's self-image by casting them as the potential 'leader' and speaking of their leadership qualities.
10. The more useful a person can be to them the more flattery they apply.
11. Simultaneously they encourage their friends to do outrageous things to prove these attributes.
12. They set them up against other comrades – sometimes referring to others as agents.
13. The more people they can pit against each other the better their intervention.
14. They hone in on vain people who clearly want social recognition and celeb.
15. They may help to fund these aspirant individual's fame-seeking social media campaigns, or connect them to people who can help.
16. They encourage their protégés to use these social media platforms to launch vitriolic attacks on people who need to be silenced or destroyed by government.
17. They encourage their unsuspecting foot soldiers to work in packs.

18. This means attacking an individual target as a pack – preferably on a public platform.
19. They themselves make suggestive comments, contradict themselves and spin outright lies on public platforms so casually that many do not notice. It takes a certain skill to spread rumors as truths.
20. They usually have high intelligence, are charismatic and play the role well – changing not only their dress code, but also language and philosophy to suit the occasion.
21. They are masters at mirroring the essence of the struggle and people who are genuine activists.
22. They display narcissistic tendencies and tend to name drop quite a bit.
23. Their tweets are more about themselves, their endless inner musings and navel-gazing, rather than the socioeconomic issues of the people they claim to represent.
24. Their educational history and work history is usually haphazard and not well presented.
25. Their Google profile is scant but they start to build up an online profile via the movement.
26. They disappear on many family-duty trips or overseas trips – not that you see the photos or hear about what went on much.
27. They are able to creep right into the inner workings of the movement and lay claim to all sorts of internal good work.
28. The mandate is to destabilise the struggle/org and create mistrust among the members.
29. They hone in onto the topics that are of legitimate concern to people in the struggle.
30. They pinpoint the most contentious issue and work with that – often building exaggerated constructs around the problem to create massive cleavages in the struggle.

31. Where once, members were able to negotiate terms of engagement and debate the problems, this person plays a big role in casting these issues as irreparable, and soon enough in-fighting replaces engagement.
32. This means that one side must be seen as victim to another side that is demonised.
33. Once the 'victim and demon' narrative has been entrenched the cracks begin to show.
34. They spend a lot of time engaging their group and new recruits to prove their theory.
35. This often involves their favourite form of narcotic and many late evenings sitting listening to them.
36. They use every single available opportunity to push their unwavering and monolithic framework no matter what the occasion or the agenda.
37. As such even events that are focused on a specific agenda will be derailed if their framework has not been included in the agenda.
38. If called out for derailing they will gaslight you with this term and use it against you – denying that it is a derailing – though everyone is indeed derailed, discombobulated disillusionsed and depressed at the end of the disruption – with little will to continue the agenda initially planned.
39. Job well done. That was the intention no matter how loudly the agent and the minions claim otherwise.
40. Because they make use of legitimate concerns to push their destabilisation agenda it is very difficult to stand up to them.
41. They know there is an outrage and fundamentalist moralism that comes with certain topics and anyone who challenges this approach will be called an apologist or denialist or an assaulter.
42. This is called the weaponisation of legitimate narratives for ulterior motives and agents receive training in this field because it is so effective in breaking up unity in movements.

43. This is an injustice to those who developed sound theory which is then warped for maximum negative impact and sold to young minds as truth.
44. No matter how many authentic overtures you make to them to engage on the contentious issue, workshop it, write manifestos and codes of conduct to deal with the issues they will all be turned down.
45. It does not suit this agenda to solve the issue.
46. The mandate is to make sure the problem is perpetual until it breaks the movement.
47. Their methodology is to spread chaos as widely as possible not to create harmony.
48. They have a clear adversary and everything they do, or ask you to do, is to discredit or destroy their targeted adversary.
49. The adversary is usually the group or individual that gets things done on the picket line, can hold the masses together with impassioned revolutionary speeches, and tie up the state in demonstrations and direct action for months on end.
50. Those marked as adversaries are most often the people that are not answerable to the powers that be and push a more progressive ideology.
51. Socialism, Black Consciousness and Environmental Justice are the most threatening doctrines to neoliberal state because they directly challenge cultural imperialism, white supremacy as well as big business and the economic status quo in a profit driven world.
52. Their orders are to destroy these leader's at all costs.
53. Reputational damage is a common strategy against leaders of movements.
54. It is no mistake that it is the strong male leaders of movements that are most often accused of sexual assault, rape and abuse with no evidence provided or police dockets and court cases to back this up.
55. An infiltrator is often at the center of these accusations.

56. This is a well-worn tactic and easy to push given the real problem of machismo, misogyny and abuse of women in a Capitalist world which encourages these binaries.
57. More often it is not about proving the rape but making sure the accused has a life sentence hanging over his head and he is never granted the opportunity to defend himself even when he has requested that a charge be laid against him.
58. The public buy the accusation as truth.
59. The colonial and contemporary construct of the Black male as sexually deviant and a rapist makes this the ideal vehicle to garner consent for the destruction and incarceration of the threatening black male.
60. No amount of pointing out how much of a disservice false rape allegations does to those who are actually victims of rape, will be entertained in this framework.
61. This is not to say that there are not times when the allegations turn out to be true or that abuse and patriarchy does not occur in movements. It does and should be reflected upon and corrected by the men in the organisations and movements.
62. Strong women leaders will be accused of being ambitious, dangerous, a publicity fiend and various unflattering terms. This is to delegitimise her role as a leader and cast doubt on her integrity.
63. In a nutshell these bogus activists perform different tasks which include attacking and/or disrupting legitimate groups, or creating a diversion with constructed propaganda in order to discredit the leaders, distract members away from the focus and involve them in time-wasting turmoil intended to prevent them from doing anything that enhances the common good.
64. These bogus activists are also used to implement hostile actions through hand-picked third parties so that it creates decoy politics that looks like a disagreement between two individuals or groups, or yet another violence between and by members. What this does is buy time for the other stakeholders.

65. Though this is government-funded infiltration it is difficult to prove any connection back to government operations and the mandate is to erase this connection through various methods.
66. The fact that they use legitimate and sensitive struggles and discourses to push their agenda, which is ultimately to destroy the struggle/movement/revolution from within, makes it very difficult to hold them accountable as the issues they work with are 'untouchable'.
67. They often move to different locations of the national movement and wherever they have spent time they leave the movement in tatters.

Personal Impact

- Agents manipulate you into believing their doctrine, which they preach often and it is exciting to you because you can relate to what they are preaching.
- In fact you relate so much that you fail to notice how they are weaponising that doctrine while turning you into one of their minions in their own private bouncer squadron.
- You find yourself going all out to protect this person from critique.
- You will start to feel low-grade depression and a pit of anxiety in your stomach when you have been in the company of this person.
- This is a sure sign that you are being manipulated to act against your instincts
- If you keep ignoring your truth, as they demand that you do, you may end up having a nervous breakdown.
- Once this happens you have become a threat to this person and are no longer useful. At this point, they will drop you with no compunction.

Suggested Reading:

[Infiltrators, Informers and Grasses: How, Why and What to do If Your Group is Targeted](#) by the Accidental Anarchist, 2013.

[Bugs, Taps and Infiltrators: What to do About Political Spying](#) by Linda Lotz, 1979.

[How to Spot an Infiltrator in Your Movement](#) by Media for Justice, 2017.

[Infiltration to Disrupt, Divide and Mis-Direct Are Widespread in Occupy](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2012.

[Infiltration of Political Movements is the Norm, Not the Exception in the United States](#) by Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, 2012.

8. Tools for Movements

In this class, we discuss the basics of organizing and describe a variety of tools that can be used to develop strategy and to evaluate tactics

Slides:

Goals of lecture	Identify an injustice
<p>After this lecture, you will be able to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Understand the basics of organizing.• Be familiar with tools for developing strategy.• Understand how to evaluate and choose tactics. <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>	<p>Identify the injustice.</p> <p>Research it individually or as a group.</p> <p>Identify your mission and short and long term goals.</p> <p>Define both the negative – what needs to end – and the positive – what needs to be created.</p> <p>Begin to educate others about the issue and recruit people to join the work on that injustice.</p> <p>Popular Resistance.org</p>


Popular Resistance.org 




Popular Resistance.org

Popular Resistance.org







Basics of Organizing (by Kevin Zeese):

Community Organizing

Form a core group: Identify people committed to improving conditions or ending an injustice. Build on common self-interests. Build unity as you grow. Seek diverse backgrounds, experiences and skills.

Identify an issue: Come together around an issue, identify and define the issue. Advocate for a positive solution as well as a negative (something that needs to stop), i.e. stop the machine, create a new world. Frame issues so people will agree with you and will ask questions to understand more. Education is the first step to building a movement.

Identify a mission and goals: Develop long-term and short-term goals that define purpose and mission. Create a narrative for your campaign.

Build out from core group: Like a circle with your core group in the center, build outward with concentric circles based on people's ability to participate, skills, interests. Build people-power to achieve the goal.

Recruiting: Getting people involved should be ongoing with each action having recruiting people as a goal, e.g. forums, tabling, petitions, flyering, surveying, canvassing. Recruit people directly impacted by the issue. Let people know what you need, give them a menu of tasks that are needed. Gather contact information (phone, email) and get in contact quickly, thank people for attending events, engage them. Support new leaders especially from impacted groups. Find out who will volunteer, i.e. make phone calls, organize others.

Engage people: Hold regular meetings or conference calls, welcome new people, act more and talk less, work in pairs, limit time commitment, hold social activities, conduct skill-building, art-making events, make it fun. Contact or call new people within a week, find out their interests, concerns, and recontact them regularly.

Identify allies: Identify individuals and organizations that share your goal and involve them.

Identify opposition: How do you move them to supporters, neutralize them, limit their influence, divide them?

Develop a strategy and plan: Strategy comes from your goal, what steps do you need to get there. Tactics serve the strategy and make-up a general plan to support strategy. Identify tactics that will achieve your short, medium and long term goals e.g. demonstrations, events, contacting elected representatives, website, social media.

Develop a Timeline: Working backward from the end of the campaign examine each stage toward your goal, imagine the moment before victory and what needs to be in place.

Develop specific activities: Set goals for very specific actions, e.g. contacts with government representatives, public events, phone call campaign, media events. Simple is better than complex.

Evaluate: Learn from success and failure. Debrief after events. Evaluate strategy, tactics and activities to improve them.

Celebrate wins: There will be many steps to your overall goal and wins along the way. Small victories should be celebrated, both internal organizational goals as well as external policy changes.

Suggested Reading:

[Steps in a Campaign](#), War Resisters International

[Organizing for Power - Resources](#)

[Beautiful Rising Toolbox](#)

[War Resisters International](#)

[How to Create a Strategy Chart](#), Greenlining

[Forms of Nonviolent Action](#), War Resisters International

[Swarthmore Nonviolent Database](#) (more than 200 tactics)

[Organizing Toolkit](#) from the Backbone Campaign

[Action Planning checklist](#)